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Chapter 1
Introduction
Standard asset pricing theory assumes that human beings are rational and hence are respon-
sive to all available information. Economic agents can instantaneously and correctly process
information and therefore the price system perfectly reflects the aggregated information. Put
differently, in an informationally efficient capital market, security prices should fully reflect
all available information and facilitate efficient capital allocation for the firm.1
However, are markets informationally efficient in reality? Information is costly. If the
security price perfectly reflects all information, then the return to acquiring information is
zero and investors who have spent efforts and resources to gather information are not com-
pensated. For example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that in a informationally efficient
market, security prices aggregate and reveal private signals acquired by traders, which elim-
inates the private incentive to collect information. To ensure that investors acquire private
information, the market has to be sufficiently noisy so that investors who collect information
can hide their information from other investors and can make a profit on the information they
1There are three forms of proposed market efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and strong form. The weak form
argues that only information contained in past prices is incorporated in the current price. The semi-strong
form asserts that the current price reflects all public available information. In the more extreme strong form,
the current price incorporates both public and private information. In a summary, Fama (1970) provides
some empirical evidence to support the weak and semi-strong market efficiency hypotheses by examining the
price reaction to publicly available information, for example, past returns, and various corporate events such
as stock splits, new security issues, and announcements of financial reports by firms. There is relatively less
evidence supporting the strong market efficiency hypothesis.
1
acquired. Kyle (1985) argues that private information is gradually incorporated into asset
prices and that the presence of noise traders improves market liquidity by allowing informed
traders to hide their information.
Further, there is ample evidence that human beings are subject to behavioral biases.2
People may react disproportionately to information. For instance, some investors may over-
react to short-term performance, purchasing stocks that have recently made large profits and
selling stocks that have experienced big losses. Such overreaction is likely to push the stock
price away from its fundamental value. Moreover, economic agents have limited capacity to
process information. For example, they may be subject to limited attention. When there
are multiple tasks, they tend to direct their attention towards the one that they perceive as
the most important one, and the others consequently receive less attention. Indeed, Simon
(1971) argues that information consumes the attention of its recipients and rich information
may create a poverty of attention and a need to efficiently allocate the attention among
information sources. Therefore, attention may play an important role in the stock market
where investors need to assess an overabundance of information. For instance, investor lim-
ited attention is closely related to the familiarity bias since examining the risk-return profile
for familiar assets may demand less efforts from investors.3
A large volume of psychology studies in fact have accumulated compelling evidence that
humans have limited attention. For example, Kahneman (1973) argues that attention is a
scarce cognitive resource and human beings do have limited capacity for processing infor-
mation. Put differently, people are attention constrained and have to carefully allocate this
limited resource across different tasks. Focusing on one task necessarily leads to reductions
in attention towards others. Motivated by this psychology phenomenon, financial economists
have paid attention to the consequences of investors’ attention constraints on financial mar-
2See Shleifer (2000) for a comprehensive overview on behavioral finance. Shiller (2005) studies the market
bubbles and the psychological factors behind them. In addition, Barber and Odean (2011) provide a summary
of research on the behavior of individual investors in the stock market.
3See, for example, Huberman (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006), Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, and Zhang (2009),
Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012), and Atanasova and Chemla (2014).
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kets, which may help explain deviations from informationally efficient markets.
Indeed, a growing body of literature investigates the impact of limited attention on asset
returns. A great proportion of this strand of research provides theoretical analysis of the topic.
In his seminal work on capital market equilibrium with incomplete information, Merton
(1987) argues that investors may not have perfect information on all stocks at all times,
perhaps due to limited attention. They have to know an individual stock before considering
to include it in their portfolios. Thus, less recognized stocks, or stocks with smaller investor
base, have to offer higher expected returns to compensate the undiversifiable risk borne by
the investors. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) propose a model of investor inattention to examine
the consequences of limited attention for disclosures, financial reporting policies, and market
trading. In a more recent study, Peng and Xiong (2006) find that limited attention may
lead to category learning. That is, attention-constrained investors may process more market-
and industry-level information than firm-specific information. In extreme cases, investor
may allocate all attention to market- and industry-level information and ignore firm-level
information. Thus, they conclude that investor limited attention may exacerbate the impact
of behavioral biases (e.g., investor overconfidence) on security prices.
However, human attention is notoriously difficult to measure and most empirical studies
on this topic rely on a range of proxies for investor attention which yield some interesting
results. For instance, one strand of existing research focuses on the time-series dimension
of investor inattention, which is also known as investor distraction and argues that when
there is competing information, investor attention may be driven away from a given piece of
information. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) find that when there are a greater number
of earnings announcements made by other firms on the same day, the immediate price and
volume reaction to the firm’s earnings surprise is much weaker, and the post-announcement
drift is much stronger. Other proxies for investor attention include extreme trading volume,
extreme abnormal returns, media coverage, and advertising expenditure.4 For example, Fang
4Media coverage and advertising expenditure is refereed to as the supply of attention, or passive attention.
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and Peress (2009) find that stocks with no media coverage earn higher future returns than
stocks with high media coverage. They conclude that media coverage disseminates informa-
tion and captures investor attention.
1.1 Limited Attention and Individual Investors
Market participants may face different types of attention constraints. Intuitively, individuals
are more likely to be affected by limited attention since they have fewer resources for evalu-
ating information. Indeed, a large volume of empirical evidence support the argument that
retail investors are most likely to suffer from the attention constraint and show that their
performances in the stock market are hence adversely affected.
Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) show that individual investors tend invest in stocks
with easily recognized products. Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are
net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks (e.g., stocks in the media, stocks with extreme past
returns, and stocks with extreme trading volume). They argue that these investors face a
formidable task of going through thousands of options available in the stock market when
making investment decisions, and are likely to consider stocks that first catch their attention.
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) show that Friday announcements have a 15% lower immediate
response but a 70% higher delayed response (measured by the post-earnings announcement
drift, or PEAD), and that trading volume is around 8% lower on Friday announcements. They
argue that the underreaction to Friday announcements is a result of weekend distraction that
affects investors’ response to information, particularly retail investors’.5 In a more recent
study, Lou (2014) finds that individual investors are also likely to be attracted by firms with
high levels of growth in advertising expenditure.
5Interestingly, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) also find that firms are perhaps aware of this underreaction
and are likely to release bad news on high distraction days.
4
1.2 Limited Attention and Institutional Investors
In contrast to retail investors, institutional investors are much more resourceful in processing
information. However, this fact per se does not mean that limited attention does apply to
professional investors. Attention is a cognitive resource rooted in all human beings and the
attention constraint should matter for all market participants. Institutional investors are
indeed more equipped in addressing the constraint, for example, by using comprehensive
computer programs and databases, but they are also affected by limited attention, perhaps
to a much lower extent.
The literature on limited attention for institutional investors is relatively small but grow-
ing. For example, Corwin and Coughenour (2008) show that attention constraints also affect
individual specialists, who are likely to allocate their attention towards their most active
stocks during times of increased trading. This action leads to less frequent price improve-
ment and increased transaction costs for the remaining assigned stocks, and adversely affects
the liquidity provision. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2015) argue that
mutual fund managers are also subject to attention constraints and should rationally allo-
cate their limited attention over the business cycle. Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) provide
compelling evidence that mutual fund managers are also influenced by mass media coverage
and may prefer attention-grabbing stocks. Specifically, they find that professional fund man-
agers are more likely to buy high-coverage stocks, but their selling behavior is less likely to be
influenced by media coverage. These fund managers trade stocks with high coverage for the
same reason as individual investors do. That is, these professional investors are also subject
to limited attention and may be attracted by stocks that appear frequently in the media.
In addition, they are able to show that mutual fund managers’ preference of high-coverage
stocks is not driven by the desire to cater fund flows or by the information in the media. In
other words, it is more likely to be a result of their own limited attention. They also find
that this action in fact hampers the fund’s future performance.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
Investor limited attention undoubtedly has an important impact on the stock market (e.g.,
trading volume and stock returns). Built upon the literature on investor limited attention,
the next two chapters of this thesis explore the effects of product market advertising in the
stock market where we use advertising expenditure as a proxy for investor attention.
Economists have debated the effect of advertising for decades. However, most research in
this field has focused on its consequences on the product markets. Indeed, a large volume of
prior empirical work has demonstrated that advertising spending is largely driven by product
market consideration (e.g., to promote sales, to prevent competition from new firms, and to
create brand loyalty). In recent years, financial economists have paid more attention to the
impact of advertising on the capital markets. This thesis is motivated by Grullon, Kanatas,
and Weston (2004) who find that advertising serves as the supply of investor attention.
They find that firms with intensive advertising have a larger number of both individual and
institutional investors. Put differently, these firms are more likely to enjoy better liquidity of
their stocks.
In Chapter 2, we examine the the relationship between advertising and the cross-section
of stock returns. We show that a strategy that longs stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the previous year and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expense in
the previous year earns a significant premium. After controlling for standard risk factors,
an advertising-based tercile portfolio can earn 0.55% per month, or 6.6% per year. We also
find that the abnormal return is generated by stocks with low growth in advertising expense
in the previous year. Stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous year
do not exhibit significant alphas. This advertising effect is closely related to the Merton
(1987)’s investor recognition hypothesis. By sorting stocks on proxies of investor recognition
(i.e., analyst coverage and institutional ownership), we show that the advertising effect is
much weaker among stocks with a high degree of investor recognition (stocks with high
analyst coverage and stocks with a high percentage of institutional ownership). Therefore,
6
advertising is likely to improve investor recognition, even if it does not convey any concrete
information about the firm’s future prospect.
We also show that the advertising effect is unlikely to be a consequence of mispricing. If
it were, the low-advertising premium would have disappeared among liquid stocks. However,
we find that sorting stocks on bid-ask spread results in significant alphas in all three spread
ranges and the difference in the magnitudes is very small. Finally, in contrast to Chemmanur
and Yan (2009), we do not find that advertising has a signalling role in the stock market.
Intuitively, good firms who know that the return on advertising is higher for them are more
likely to use advertising as a costly signal. If advertising could signal the firm’s type in the
stock market, the magnitude of the abnormal return should be highest among most con-
strained stocks, since these firms are less likely to secure financing, and investors may believe
that only the ones with very good prospects are willing to invest intensively in advertising.
However, we find that the advertising effect in the contemporaneous year is strongest among
stocks with a low degree of financial constraints (i.e., the KZ index and the WW index).6
We do find that the advertising effect in the subsequent year is strongest among financially
constrained firms. Perhaps financially constrained firms who do not advertise may be con-
sidered more risky by investors and need to offer a higher return to compensate the risk.
Indeed, we find that the abnormal return comes from stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the previous year. The premium of the advertising-based strategy may simply be
a compensation for risk not captured by the standard risk factors.
In Chapter 3, we explore the effect of advertising in the capital market by investigating
the relationship between advertising and firm risk. We show that advertising is negatively
related to systematic risk, particularly during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. We also find
that advertising is positively related to idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but not during
the crisis. Further, we show that firms on average had lower systematic risk but higher
6We investigate the advertising effect in the contemporaneous year by forming a portfolio that longs
stocks with high growth in advertising expense and shorts stocks with low growth in advertising expense in
the contemporaneous year. The portfolio generates a significant positive alpha.
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idiosyncratic risk during the crisis. The negative relationship of advertising to systematic
risk is likely a result of the market-based intangible assets provided by advertising (e.g., brand
equity, customer loyalty, and bargaining power with suppliers) which may insulate the firm
from market downturns. The results also lend support to the literature on investor limited
attention. Investors, especially institutional investors, who are attracted by advertising, may
collect and trade on private information about the firm. This action may provide investors
more accurate assessment of the firm’s current financial performance and future prospect.
Thus, firms with intensive advertising may have higher idiosyncratic in that their share prices
may be more informative by impounding this unique information.
In Chapter 4, we turn to sell-side financial analysts, who play an important role in col-
lecting costly private information and reducing the degree of information asymmetries in
financial markets. Investors may seek financial advice from analysts in order to make better
investment decisions. However, financial analysts are exposed to various incentives and may
not always provide the most accurate forecasts. They can be optimistic as well as pessimistic.
We provide a simple single-period model to study the effects of the trading incentive and the
reputational concern on the informativeness of analyst’s earnings forecasts. We find that if
the analyst has only the reputational concern, she is likely to discard her private signal and
conform to the investor’s extreme prior, leading to a lower degree of informativeness in her
forecast; if the analyst is motivated by only the trading commission, she has a strong incen-
tive to report against the investor’s prior belief, regardless of her private information; finally,
if the analyst is motivated by both the reputational concern and the trading incentive, we
find that she is more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic.
8
Chapter 2
Advertising and the Cross-section of
Stock Returns
Summary
We examine the relationship between advertising and stock returns. We find that stocks
with low growth in advertising spending outperform stocks with high growth in advertising
spending in the long run. A portfolio that longs stock with low growth in advertising spending
in the past year and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising spending in the past year
earns a significant premium. By sorting firms on two proxies of investor recognition, we find
that the advertising effect is concentrated among stocks with no and low analyst coverage,
and stocks with low percentage of institutional ownership. The advertising effect is also
stronger among financially constrained firms and the portfolio alpha comes from the long
position (stocks with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year). Our evidence
suggests that the advertising effect is consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis.
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2.1 Introduction
The biggest 100 advertisers in 2013 alone spent more than 100 billion dollars on various types
of advertisements. The effect of advertising on sales is undoubtedly prominent. However,
little is known about its financial implication. In this paper, we examine the stock return
pattern of advertising firms in the long run and more importantly, explain the advertising
effect.1
It is commonly acknowledged that advertising is usually targeted at consumers. Never-
theless, it may also have a significant impact on investors. For example, advertising may
increase the firm’s visibility among investors. It may also signal the firm’s type because firms
with good prospects are more likely to spend a large amount on advertising. Put differently,
if the effects of advertising on the product market (e.g., sales and consumer loyalty) can be
translated into firm value, so could its effects on the capital market. Indeed, we find that in
the long run subsequent to the advertising year, stocks with low growth in advertising spend-
ing outperform stocks with high growth in advertising spending. A zero-investment strategy
that longs stocks with low growth in advertising expenses in the previous year and shorts
stocks with high growth in the previous year earns a significant premium: the low-advertising
premium is 0.65% per month, or 7.8% per year.
It is possible that the return premium can be absorbed by well known risk factors (e.g.,
the market factor, the size factor, the value factor, the momentum factor, and the liquidity
factor). For example, our long-short strategy can pick up the size effect by longing small-cap
stocks and shorting large-cap stocks, since large firms are less likely to be cash-constrained
and can spend a great deal more on advertising. It can also be a result of illiquid stocks
concentrating on the long leg. Thus, we regress the time series of portfolio returns on these
risk factors. We find that the low-advertising premium remains significant with a magnitude
1Advertising may influence firm values both in the short run and in the long horizon. For example,
Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) document that stocks with higher advertising expenses enjoy better
liquidity and have a larger number of both individual and institutional investors. In addition, Lou (2014)
provides empirical evidence that managers may adjust advertising expense in order to influence short-term
stock returns.
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of 55 basis points per month. We also document that the premium is particularly large among
stocks with a low fraction of institutional ownership, stocks with a high degree of financial
constraints (the KZ index), stocks with a low past twelve-month return, and stocks with a
medium level of dollar trading volume; the premiums among these stocks are 90, 90, 93, and
94 basis points per month, respectively. Further, the low-advertising premium is economically
significant for most types of stocks, except for high-priced stocks, stocks with a high level of
dollar trading volume, and stocks with a high percentage of institutional ownership.
We form our portfolios based on the most recent financial data in each month and report
the equally-weighted average returns, using the overlapping portfolio approach of Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993). The disparity between the frequencies of the financial information and
portfolio rebalancing may subject our analysis to bias.2 However, additional analysis shows
that our results are not subsumed by the way of forming the portfolio. The risk-adjusted
returns in months 1-6 and in months 7-12 are 53 and 46 basis points per month, respectively.
In addition, we also show that the well known January effect does not have a significant
impact on our results.3
Further analysis shows that our results are robust to different portfolio formation meth-
ods. We use the quintile- and decile-portfolio approaches to construct our zero-investment
strategy and find that the low-advertising premium remains economically large and statis-
tically significant. By sorting stocks into quintile portfolios, a strategy that longs stocks
with the lowest growth in advertising spending in the previous year and shorts stocks with
the highest growth in advertising spending in the previous year earns an abnormal return
of 73 basis points per month. A strategy using the decile-portfolio approach produces a
risk-adjusted return of 108 basis points per month.
2Note that our advertising spending data is from the Compustat Annual File and about 56% firms in our
sample have their fiscal-year end in December (defined as DATADATE variable). Further, there is usually a
gap of up to six months between the fiscal-year end and the actual annual report release date. Therefore, firms
may release financial results for the same financial year on various dates, which may cluster, for example, in
the first half of the year.
3The January effect is a calendar effect that affects small-cap stocks more than mid- and large-cap stocks.
Our results may pick up this effect by longing small-cap stocks.
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In a nutshell, the persistence of the low-advertising premium indicates that advertising
indeed has a very strong impact on the stock market. The advertising effect is perhaps
most related to the rational-agent framework proposed by Merton (1987). Investors have
limitations in processing information and only know a subset of the securities available in the
stock market. If the firm is known to only a few people, its investors may demand a higher
expected return to compensate for their undiversified positions because it is more difficult to
find a potential buyer for the firm’s shares. Put differently, firms with lower degree of investor
recognition must offer higher returns to compensate their investors for the idiosyncratic risk.
Therefore, less recognized stocks may earn a premium over those which are more visible to
investors. More importantly, in a market with information asymmetries, firm value increases
in the degree of investor recognition of the firm.
Advertisements may cause a rise in the firm’s share price in the advertising year, but
this rise may subsequently diminish or even reverse in the long run. By sorting stocks on
two proxies of investor recognition, we find strong evidence to support this interpretation.
The advertising effect is insignificant among stocks with high analyst coverage, and much
stronger among stocks with no and low analyst coverage with a magnitude of about 64 basis
points per month. Further, the effect is strongest (weakest) among stocks who have a low
(high) percentage of institutional ownership with a magnitude of almost 90 basis points (0
basis point) per month. But the advertising effect is also considerably strong among stocks
with a medium percentage of institutional ownership (79 basis points per month).
Alternatively, the impediment-to-trade hypothesis may explain the low-advertising pre-
mium. Theories suggest that uninformed investors may have asymmetric information and
face significant illiquid costs imposed by informed investors, and therefore expect to earn a
higher return on illiquid assets which may be traded at a lower price than their expected cash
flows.4 Indeed, a large body of literature finds that liquidity can predict future returns.5
4The relationship between stock returns and illiquidity has been vigorously examined by a large collection
of studies. See Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2006) for a detailed review on this line of research.
5See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003).
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The advertising effect may be a consequence of such mispricing. In this scenario, the
advertising effect should be strongest among the most illiquid stocks. To test this hypothesis,
we form portfolios based on a host of liquidity measures, such as price, bid-ask spread, trading
volume, and the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud (2002)), and examine the abnormal
return on our advertising strategy. In general, the results provide less clear evidence. We
find that sorting stocks on past month average closing price provides the strongest support
for the impediment-to-trade hypothesis. The advertising effect is strongest among low-priced
stocks with a magnitude of 84 basis points per month. High-priced stocks on the other hand
do not exhibit a significant advertising effect. In addition, sorting stocks on daily average
trading volume and the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio provides mixed evidence. The advertising
effect is insignificant among stocks with a high level of liquidity, as expected. But stocks
with a medium level of liquidity, rather than stocks with a low level of liquidity, exhibit
the strongest advertising effect. Further, sorting stocks on bid-ask spread provides evidence
inconsistent with the hypothesis: the advertising effect is significant in all three spread terciles
with a similar magnitude.
It is generally acknowledged that advertising can signal the quality of the firm’s product
or service in the product markets.6 Consumers may be convinced that its product or service
is better than its competitors’.7 It is possible that advertising also signals the firm’s type
in the capital markets. For example, Chemmanur and Yan (2009) find that the good type
tends to signal its valuation by increasing product market advertising prior to IPO/SEO to
reduce equity underpricing around new issues.
If the signalling theory can explain the low-advertising premium, we would observe that
the advertising effect in the contemporaneous year is most pronounced among firms who are
most financially constrained. We argue that this type of firms have an insufficient amount
of cash to spend and only the ones who have great future prospects are willing to continue
to invest in advertising. By sorting stocks into terciles on two popular proxies for financial
6See, for example, Nelson (1974), Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984).
7This is perhaps a benefit of brand equities, a valuable intangible asset created by advertising.
13
constraints (i.e., the KZ index and the WW index) and growth in ad spending in the con-
temporaneous year, we do not find supportive evidence. The advertising effect is strongest
among stocks with a low degree of financial constraints.8 Overall, we find that the advertising
effect is consistent with the investor recognition story. It is inconsistent with the signalling
interpretation, and perhaps cannot be explained by the illiquidity hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review relevant literature.
In Section 3, we describe the sample selection procedure and provide summary statistics for
our sample. In Section 4, we examine the relationship between advertising and stock returns.
In Section 5, we explore the possible interpretations of the advertising effect. In Section 6,
we include robustness checks. In Section 7, we conclude.
2.2 Literature
Economists have debated the role of advertising for decades. However, most research has
focused on its effects on the product markets.9
Indeed, prior empirical work has demonstrated that advertising is closely associated with
the product market. In fact, advertising spending is largely driven by product market con-
sideration (e.g., to promote sales, to prevent new firms entering the industry, and to create
brand loyalty).10 Thus, although general accounting standards (e.g., the GAAP and the
IFRS) require that advertising costs to be expensed rather than capitalized, both academics
and business professionals believe that advertising may create a valuable intangible asset.
In recent years, economists have paid more attention to the impact of advertising on
the capital markets. Our paper contributes to this collection of literature by exploring the
effect of advertising on stock returns and the possible mechanisms by which this effect arises.
Specifically, we investigate the investor recognition hypothesis, the illiquidity hypothesis, and
the signalling hypothesis.
8Note that the high-advertising premiums are insignificant across the other financial constraint terciles.
9For a review on the economics of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
10See, for example, Tirole (1988), Erickson and Jacobson (1992) and Sutton (1991).
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2.2.1 Investor Attention
Our paper is related to the literature on limited investor attention. Kahneman (1973) suggests
that people have limits in processing information at the same time and attention is a scarce
cognitive resource. An application of this proposition in the capital market is the individual
investors’ behavior in the stock market. They have very limited resource and are unable
to evaluate all available stocks in the market, and therefore are likely to limit their choices
to a subset of stocks that first catch their attention. For example, Peng and Xiong (2006)
propose a theoretical framework to study how limited attention influences investors’ behavior
in the stock market. Barber and Odean (2008) provide empirical evidence that individual
investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks (e.g., stocks in the news, stocks with
extreme returns and stocks with a high level of trading volume). Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001) document that investors are more likely to invest in firms that they are familiar with
(e.g., firms that are close to them, that communicate in investors’ native tongue, and that
have senior managements from the same cultural background). Keloharju, Knüpfer, and
Linnainmaa (2012) also show that firm customers are more likely to hold and less likely to
sell the firm’s stocks.
Merton (1987) suggests that securities that are known to a few investors need to provide
a premium to compensate for the idiosyncratic risk, and firm value should increase in the
number of investors, a measure of investor recognition. Several empirical studies provide
supportive evidence for this framework. For example, Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) find
a positive relationship between the cross-sectional stock returns and the shadow cost of
incomplete information which is related to the shareholder base.
2.2.2 Advertising and the Capital Market
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the effect of advertising in the capital market.
For example, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2012) show that new owners of acquired brands
are more likely to decrease advertising spending and investors are likely to view this cut
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as efficient cost saving, which is reflected by its positive relationship with the combined
buyer plus seller announcement return. Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) demonstrate
that product market advertising may have a spillover effect and increase the firm’s visibility
among investors. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that investors prefer to invest in
firms with good brand perception and brand visibility is associated with a more diverse
ownership structure.
The increase in investor attention may cause a temporary upward pressure on the firm’s
share price, which may subsequently reverse. A large collection of empirical research tests
this hypothesis and focuses on the impact of advertising on firm values. Fehle, Tsyplakov,
and Zdorovtsov (2005) document that firms who advertise in Super Bowl broadcasts exhibit
significant positive abnormal returns that do not reverse in the subsequent period. Gurun
and Butler (2012) find that media use less negative words about local firms in the news and
this positive local media slant is strongly related to firm share price.11 Lou (2014) finds that
managers are likely to be aware that a high level of advertising in the short run may increase
investor attention and overshoot the firm’s share price. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) provide
evidence that firm visibility is associated with product market advertising and firms may
increase advertising spending prior to new security issues to mitigate equity underpricing.
Chemmanur and Yan (2010) also investigate the impact of advertising on stock returns. In a
more recent study, Madsen and Niessner (2014) use Google searches for firm tickers and daily
advertising data to find that investors are attracted by product market advertisements, and
the increase in attention in turn has a temporary positive impact on the firm’s share price.
2.2.3 Media Coverage and the Capital Market
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on the relationship between media coverage
and the capital market. Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) show that the stock market reacts
efficiently to the rumors of takeovers in the news. Chan (2003) finds a strong drift after
11Gurun and Butler (2012) also document that the positive media slant is associated with the firm’s local
media advertising expenditure.
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bad news in public media and concludes that investors react slowly to the information con-
tained in such news. Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998) provide empirical evidence that
the relative salience of news is important for investors’ reaction to the change in economic
fundamentals.
A number of studies also investigates the link between media coverage and the cross-
section of stock returns. Tetlock (2007) finds that negative news in media may cause a
downward pressure on the firm’s share price which subsequently reverts to fundamentals.
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) also demonstrate that public news contains
non-redundant information which is incorporated into security prices, and negatives words
in the news can predict low firm earnings. Finally, Fang and Peress (2009) find that media
coverage may affect asset prices even it does not provide non-redundant information.
2.3 Sample Description
2.3.1 Data Collection
Our sample of advertising firms consists of firms who are listed on the NYSE, the AMEX
and the NASDAQ between January 1st 1974 and December 31st 2012.12 We first obtain
firm fundamentals from the Compustat annual database. We then delete firms with missing
information on advertising expenditure. To mitigate firm fixed effects, we use percentage
growth in advertising spending rather than the dollar level to investigate the relationship
between advertising and the cross-section of stock returns.13 14
Around 56% of our sample firms have their fiscal-year end in December. However, it is
well documented that firms often issue their annual reports at much later dates. In addition,
financial statement issue dates are normally not recorded in most databases. To overcome
12Advertising spending data is first available on Compustata Annual Data in 1974.
13For example, large firms are more likely to report non-zero advertising expenses and the level of adver-
tising expense is correlated with size.
14This process reduces the number of observations we use in later analysis since firms are required to report
non-missing advertising expense in two or more consecutive years.
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this data collection issue, we use the FDATE variable from the Compustat annual file as the
issue date for firms who report non-missing values on this variable.15 For firms with missing
values on FDATE, we assume that they report financial information six months after the
fiscal-year end. For example, if the firm’s fiscal-year end of year 2010 is December 31st 2010,
we suppose that its financial report is available on July 1st 2011.
The magnitude of percentage growth in advertising spending can be exceptionally large.
For example, a firm may spend only $100 on advertising in a year and $100,000 in the
subsequent year, resulting in a 99900% growth. Thus, we delete firms that report lower
than $10,000 on advertising expenditure from our sample to mitigate the effect of outliers.
We further winsorize the change variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In the summary
statistics, the ratio variables Ad/Sales and Ad/Assets are also winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
We next obtain monthly stock returns for the advertising firms from the CRSP monthly
file. Following prior research, we remove firms with lower than $1 share price from the
sample to ensure that our results are not driven by small or illiquid stocks. Finally, we
merge the Compustat file and the CRSP file. Our final sample consists of 71,251 firm-year
observations.16
2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 reports the firm characteristics for advertising firms in our sample for the 1974-2012
period. The average size for advertising firms is 5.177 billion dollars in total assets, with a
median of 189.3 million dollars in total assets. The average sales is 2.08 billion dollars with a
median of 133.7 million dollars. Firms in our sample on average spend 54.75 million dollars
on advertising, with a median of 2.402 million dollars. The mean Ad/Sales and Ad/Assets
ratios are 0.0457 and 0.0461, respectively. Lastly, the average growth on advertising spending
15The variable FDATE (Final Date) indicates the date when the annual report is finalized.
16We are aware that in the following analysis the number of firm-year observations may differ slightly due
to data restrictions. Some firms may have missing information on CRSP variables, for example, trading
volume and bid-ask spread.
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is 29% and the median is 9.41%.
Our sample represents a fraction of the Compustat universe. The number of firm-year
observations with missing advertising expense data is twice as much as that with non-missing
data. Compared to non-advertising firms, we find that advertising firms are on average larger.
For example, the average market capitalization for advertising firms is 2.02 billion dollars,
corresponding to 1.329 billion dollars for non-advertising firms; the average sales for non-
advertising firms is 1.506 billion dollars, which is lower than that for advertising firms (2.08
billion dollars). However, the mean and median firm ages for advertising firms and non-
advertising firms are nearly the same.17
More interestingly, non-advertising firms on average do not seem to borrow much less
than advertising firms do. The difference in mean total liabilities is not as large as that in
mean total assets. In fact, the median total liability for non-advertising firms is 220.8 million
dollars, considerably higher than that for advertising firms (178.7 million dollars).
2.4 Advertising and Stock Returns
It is well acknowledged that the main drive for advertising is product market consideration
(e.g., promoting products and attracting potential customers). However, advertising may
have a spillover effect on the capital market. For example, advertising may put a upward
pressure on the firm’s share price in the short term (i.e., the advertising year), and this
pressure may dissipate in the long run, leading to a reversal in stock returns.
In this section, we exam the link between advertising and the cross-section of stock returns.
We first examine the raw returns in univariate analysis, and then investigate the abnormal
returns in a multivariate framework to control for well-known risk factors. Our sample
covers the period from 1974 to 2012. Year 1974 is the first year when advertising spending
information became available on the Compustat annual file. Note that because we use changes
in advertising rather than the level of advertising to perform the analysis, our tests may
17Firm age is the number of years the firm has been listed on the CRSP database.
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include fewer observations.
2.4.1 Univariate Analysis
Lou (2014) points out that managers may adjust advertising in order to influence the firm’s
share price in the short term. In this paper, we focus on the effect of advertising on firm
values by investigating the relationship between advertising and stock returns in the long run
subsequent to the advertising year.
Firms with high growth in advertising spending may underperform firms with low growth
in advertising spending in the long run. The former is likely to experience an increase in
investor attention and hence higher share price in the advertising year, which may revert
subsequently. The later, on the other hand, are more likely to earn a premium according to
Merton (1987), because they are more likely to be neglected by investors and need to offer a
premium to compensate the idiosyncratic risk.
In this section, we examine the raw returns of the portfolios on advertising. First, we
sort firms into three groups with equal number of observations based on a variety of firm
characteristics, such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, past returns and price. Within each
group, we then use the most recent financial information from the Compustat file to double
sort firms into three groups in each month by the percentage change in advertising spending in
the previous year: low-, medium-, and high-growth group. For example, all firms are included
in one of following nine portfolios: Small Size/Low Ad Growth, Small Size/Medium Ad
Growth, Small Size/High Ad Growth, Medium Size/Low Ad Growth, Medium Size/Medium
Ad Growth, Medium Size/High Ad Growth, Large Size/Low Ad Growth, Large Size/Medium
Ad Growth and Large Size/High Ad Growth. Note that portfolios are equally-weighted and
rebalanced every month. We then compute the average monthly return for each portfolio
and the return difference between the low- and high-growth groups.
Table 2.2 reports the average monthly return for each portfolio and the return difference
between the low- and high-growth groups in each subsample. Panel A shows that sorting
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stocks unconditionally on the change in advertising expense in the previous fiscal year can
yield a significant premium. The average monthly returns for the low-, medium-, and high-
growth groups are 1.93%, 1.49%, and 1.28%, respectively. The difference between the low-
and high-growth groups is statistically significant at the 1% level with a magnitude of 0.65%
per month.
In Panel B, firms are first sorted into three size groups based on market capitalization.
The results in general support the our hypothesis that firms with high growth in advertising
expense underperform those with low growth in the long run. Interestingly, the return
difference between the low- and high-growth groups is largest among small caps and smallest
among large caps. On average, stocks with low growth in advertising expense outperform
those with high growth by 0.82% per month (9.84% per year) for small firms, compared to
0.34% per month (4.1% per year) for large firms.
Panel C reports the average monthly returns for the nine portfolios double sorted on the
book-to-market ratio and the percentage change in advertising spending. The return differ-
ences between the low- and high-growth groups are statistically significant and economically
large in all the three terciles: 0.58%, 0.38%, and 0.60%, respectively.
In Panel D and E, we sort advertising firms into three groups based on the average monthly
return over the past year and the past month return, respectively. The results are generally
consistent with the unconditional result in Panel A. Further, it seems that the advertising
effect is strongest among stocks with low past returns. For example, Panel D reports a large
difference of 1.07% per month (12.84% per year) in average monthly returns between the
low- and high-growth groups for firms with low average returns in the past year. In Panel E,
among firms who have low returns in the past month, stocks with low growth in advertising
spending in the previous year outperform stocks with high growth in advertising spending in
the previous year by an average of 0.79% per month (9.48% per year).
Panel F reports the average monthly returns for portfolios first sorted on the average daily
closing price in the past month and next on the percentage change in advertising expense.
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The results are generally in line with the unconditional result except for high-priced stocks.
In this group, the return difference between the low- and high-growth groups is merely 0.08%
per month, or 0.96% per year.
Overall, the univariate analysis provide strong support for the hypothesis that stocks
with high growth in advertising expense underperform stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the long run. The difference in the average monthly return between the low- and
high-growth groups is positive in all cases and significant in most cases.
2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis
2.4.2.1 Baseline Result
In this section, we examine whether the advertising effect is subsumed by widely accepted
risk factors. Following Fang and Peress (2009) and Lou (2014), we form a zero-investment
long-short portfolio based on the percentage change in advertising expense in the previous
year. Firms are sorted into terciles at the end of each month using the most recent financial
information available on the Compustat annual file.18
In our strategy, we long stocks with low growth in advertising spending in the previous
year, and short stocks with high growth in advertising spending in the previous year. The
portfolio is equally-weighted in both legs and rebalanced every month. We then compute the
time series returns for the portfolio as well as for the long leg and the short leg.19 The time
series returns are regressed on four widely accepted factor models to account for standard risk
factors: the market model, the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)),
the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart (1997)), and the five-factor model including the
Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor (Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)). We perform the analysis
by adding one risk factor at a time. If these risk factors can explain the return premium, we
18Note that the issue date of financial reports is either FDATE with non-missing values or six months after
the fiscal-year end, as before.
19We use the percentage change in advertising expense in the previous year to sort firms. Therefore, our
analysis includes less observations than in the sample.
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would observe a non-significant alpha.
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the regression results for the portfolio return. We use the
Newey-West procedure (Newey and West (1987)) with twelve lags to address the autocorre-
lation issue.The advertising effect remains significant even after we account for risk factors
such as market, size, value, momentum, and liquidity. In Column (4) where we regress the
portfolio time series returns on the five-factor model, the magnitude of the estimated alpha
is nearly 55 basis points per month (t =5.06).
Interestingly, the risk factors do not seem to explain much of the low-advertising premium.
The alpha in the market model in Column (1) is 71 basis points per month (t=4.94), indicating
that the common risk factors only capture a small fraction of the return premium. The
coefficients on the risk factors are insignificant in most cases except for HML. The positive
coefficient on HML remains significant with a similar magnitude through Column (2)-(4),
indicating a strong positive exposure of our strategy on the value factor.
Panel B and C of Table 2.3 present the results for the long position and the short position
of the zero-investment portfolio, respectively. The alpha for the long (short) leg is significant
(insignificant) in all cases. After controlling for market, size, value, momentum, and liquidity,
the alpha for the long leg is 55 basis points per month (t=5.62), while the alpha for the short
leg is not significantly different from zero (t=0.05). Therefore, a significant portion of the
advertising effect is driven by the long position which consists of stocks with low growth in
advertising expense. These stocks are more likely to be neglected and therefore investors
may demand a higher expected return on them.
The disparity between the frequencies of portfolio rebalancing and the financial informa-
tion we use may cause bias to our analysis. For example, a large portion of firms have the
fiscal-year end on December 31st and there is usually a delay in publishing the annual report
of up to six months. It is possible that a significant proportion of the portfolio rebalancing
happens around a certain point of time in a given year. To examine whether our results
are influenced by this disparity, we investigate the return results for the advertising-based
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strategy in two periods, months 1-6 and 7-12, separately.
Panel A and B in Table 2.4 present the regression results. The magnitudes of the alpha in
the two periods are similar. After accounting for standard risk factors, such as market, size,
value, momentum, and liquidity, the abnormal return in months 1-6 is 53 basis points per
month (t=4.12), slightly higher than the 46 basis points per month (t=3.96) in months 7-12.
The coefficients on the risk factors are insignificant in most cases except for HML as before.
Thus, we conclude that the method of portfolio formation does not have a significant effect
on our results. In unreported results, we confirm that stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the previous year continue to exhibit a positive and significant alpha, whilst stocks
with high growth in advertising expense in the previous year exhibit no excess return.
Our analysis may be affected by the well-documented January effect if the long leg is
biased towards small-cap firms.20 From 1974 to 2012, the average of excess market returns
in January is 14%, compared with 5% in the rest months. However, the difference between
the portfolio returns in January and in other months is only half of that between the excess
market returns. Further, as shown in Panel C of Table 2.4, if we exclude all observations in
January, the alpha for the advertising-based strategy is 53 basis points per month (t=5.76),
which is very similar to that using all observations (55 basis points). Therefore, it seems that
the January effect does not have a strong impact on our strategy.
2.4.2.2 Advertising Effect in Subsamples
In this section, we investigate the advertising effect in subsamples of firms. The purpose of
this analysis is to compare the return premium among firms with relatively similar charac-
teristics and examine which type of firms exhibits the strongest advertising effect.
The analysis consists of two steps. First, we sort firms into three groups by a variety of
firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market, past twelve-month return, and past month
20The January effect is first documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976). There is also a collection of intensive
studies on explaining the effect. See, for example, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) and Kamstra, Kramer, and
Levi (2003).
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return. Then we identify firms using the percentage change in advertising expense in the
past year. Within each group on firm characteristics, we construct a portfolio that longs
stocks with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year and shorts stocks with
high growth in advertising in the previous year as before. We then compute the time series
returns of the equally-weighted portfolio. Next, we regress the time series returns on various
risk factors and report the excess return for the advertising-based strategy. This two-step
procedure in fact controls firm characteristics in a twofold manner.
Table 2.5 presents a number of interesting results. Panel A shows that the advertising
effect is strongest among small-cap stocks with a magnitude of 68 basis points per month
(t=4.41), after controlling for various risk factors. In addition, the difference is relatively
small between small- and medium-cap stocks: the magnitude of the advertising effect among
the later is 50 basis points per month (t=3.31). However, the advertising-based strategy does
not continue to exhibit an alpha of a similar magnitude among large-cap stocks. The risk-
adjusted return is only 25 basis points per month (t=1.83) for these stocks. In unreported
results, we find that stocks with high growth in advertising spending in the previous year
exhibit a negative and significant alpha among medium- and large-cap stocks, but not among
large-cap stocks. Further, stocks with low growth in advertising spending in the past year
only earn a significant premium among large-cap stocks.
The fact that the magnitude of advertising effect decreases in the size of firms does not
mean that it is a disguised size-effect. In fact, it is in line with the investor recognition
hypothesis. First, we use the percentage change in advertising expense rather than the dollar
change or the dollar level of advertising expense to sort firms. This step effectively controls
firm fixed effects. Second, by sorting firms into terciles on size, we again control the size effect
in the same tercile. The firms in the same tercile should differ a great deal more on growth
in advertising expense than on size. If the advertising effect is truly a size effect, it should
simply have disappeared in each tercile. Lastly, the fact that the advertising effect is strongest
among small-cap stocks and weakest among large-cap stocks is perhaps a consequence of firm
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visibility. Large firms already have a very high degree of firm visibility. Small firms, on the
other hand, are less likely to be known to many investors and can benefit more from the
improved firm visibility by investing in advertising. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the
advertising effect is most pronounced among small sized firms.21
The rest of Table 2.5 shows that the advertising effect is significant in most cases, except
among stocks with medium past twelve-month return. Overall, the results are consistent
with the hypothesis that stocks with low growth in advertising expense outperform stocks
with high growth in advertising expense in the long run. The advertising effect is perhaps
strongest among small-cap stocks, stocks with low past twelve-month return, and stocks with
low past-month return.
2.4.2.3 Fama-MacBeth Regression
We also run the Fama-MacBeth regression (Fama and MacBeth (1973)) to study the rela-
tionship between advertising and future stock returns. We control for a series of stock return
predictors in the regression, such as firm size (the log of market capitalization), the book-
to-market ratio, firm age, 12-month cumulative stock returns in the advertising year, and
average monthly turnover in the advertising year. The dependent variable is the monthly
stock return in the year subsequent to the advertising year. In addition, we include changes in
net incomes, total assets, sales, and capital expenditures in the analysis as they are correlated
with changes in advertising expense.
As shown in Table 2.6, the coefficient on the variable of interest 4Adv remains negative
and significant, even after controlling for a number of return predictors and firm charac-
teristics. In fact, firm size, firm age, and cumulative returns (momentum) do not seem to
be related with the return pattern; only the book-to-market ratio and turnover can predict
future stock returns. More interestingly, changes in total assets negatively forecast future
stock returns.
21Fang and Peress (2009) find a similar but less significant result on media coverage.
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Together with the portfolio analysis, the evidence provides strong support for the hypoth-
esis that growth in advertising expense may negatively predict future stock returns. This
advertising effect is not subsumed by standard return predictors or firm characteristics.
2.5 The Mechanism
In this section, we explore the possible explanations for the advertising effect. More specif-
ically, we are interested in the following frameworks which have particular relevance to the
advertising effect: the Merton (1987)’s investor recognition hypothesis, the illiquidity hy-
pothesis, and the signalling hypothesis.
The procedure is the same as before. We first sort firms into terciles based on the relevant
measures for each framework. For example, we use institutional ownership and analyst
coverage as proxies of investor recognition. Next, we form a zero-investment portfolio in
each tercile that longs stocks with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year
and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous year. We then
regress the time series of portfolio returns on common risk factors and examine the abnormal
returns.
2.5.1 Investor Recognition
Prior research offers empirical evidence on investors being attracted to attention-grabbing
stocks. For example, Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are more likely
to buy stocks in the news, stocks with extreme returns, and stocks with high abnormal
trading volume. Although advertising is mainly for promoting the firm’s product or service
and does not provide any genuine or useful information about its future prospect, it can also
attract potential investors.22
22An example of such advertising is the so-called “corporate advertising”, which is targeted for investors
rather than consumers. But product advertising can also attract investors since they are exposed to general
advertisements, including corporate and product advertising.
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Indeed, several studies document that advertising can improve investor recognition. For
example, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find a contemporaneous relationship between
advertising and the breadth of ownership such that firms with greater advertising spendings
tend to have more individual and institutional investors, and enjoy better common stock
liquidity. According to Merton (1987), an increase in the degree of investor recognition may
cause a rise in the firm’s share price. However, the upward pressure on stock price may
subsequently disappear or even reverse and the firm may underperform in the long run. An
alternative interpretation of the framework is that neglected stocks are more likely to earn a
premium since such stocks need to provide a higher return to compensate for the idiosyncratic
risk.
In order to test whether the Merton (1987)’s assertion explains the advertising effect, we
use two proxies of investor recognition, analyst coverage and institutional ownership, to sort
firms. Although these two proxies do not directly measure the number of investors of the firm,
they may represent the degree of information asymmetries, which is the foundation of the
whole framework. First, analysts perform financial analysis about the firm and disseminate
valuable information to investors. They certainly can improve investor recognition for the
firm, for example, by recommending it to new investors. Therefore, high analyst coverage
can indicate a high degree of investor recognition for the firm. Second, unlike individual
investors, institutional investors are less attention-constrained and therefore less likely to
face the same search problem. In other words, institutional investors are less likely to suffer
from the informational friction.23 Thus, institutional ownership can reflect the degree of
information asymmetries and more importantly, the degree of investor recognition. If the
investor recognition hypothesis explains the advertising effect, we would observe that the
return premium is higher among stocks who are less recognized by investors.
We find strong evidence supporting this interpretation. Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that
23Individual investors need to search across thousands of stocks in the market when making investment
decisions. Their attention is likely to be limited to a subset of stocks, for example, stocks with extreme
returns and stocks in the media.
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the advertising effect is significant in all three terciles. However, it also indicates that the
magnitude of advertising effect among stocks with no and low analyst coverage is much
higher than that among stocks with high analyst coverage. Further, Panel B shows that the
advertising effect is strongest among stocks with low and medium percentages of institutional
ownership. More importantly, stocks with a high percentage of institutional ownership does
not exhibit a significant advertising effect at all. It seems that the advertising effect is
concentrated on stocks who are more likely to be neglected by investors (i.e., stocks with
a low percentage of institutional ownership and stocks with no and low analyst coverage).
Firms with a high degree of investor recognition already enjoy better visibility and advertising
is less likely to reduce the informational friction in this scenario. Therefore, it is not surprising
to observe that the advertising effect is weakest among these firms.
2.5.2 Impediment to Trade
In markets with no informational frictions, securities should be traded at the same price if
they have the same cash flows. However, in practice, uninformed investors in illiquid assets
often face a high degree of information asymmetries and significant costs of illiquidity imposed
by their informed counterparty. The costs of illiquidity have an important effect on security
prices because these hard-to-trade securities may be traded at a discount relative to their
expected cash flows. Investors may require a higher expected return for bearing the liquidity
risk. For example, the seller of an illiquid asset may find it difficult to locate a buyer, who
on the other hand knows that she will bear the illiquidity costs and therefore demands a
discount. Put differently, the seller must trade off between search and selling the security at
a discount.
A body of recent empirical work provides evidence that liquidity may predict future stock
returns. Jones (2002) shows that low turnover, as well as large spread, is associated with
higher future stock returns. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find that from 1966 through
1999, stocks with high liquidity risk (high sensitivities to liquidity) outperform stocks with
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low liquidity risk by 7.5% per year and a liquidity risk factor (the PS Liquidity factor) explains
about 50% of the premium for a momentum strategy over the same period. Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) document that liquidity risk leads to a low contemporaneous return and a
high expected return. In addition, Sadka (2006) shows that the variable component of the
liquidity level, rather than the fixed component, is incorporated in security prices.
The observed low-advertising premium for an advertising-based strategy can represent
such an arbitrage opportunity. Stocks with low growth in advertising expense are likely to be
known to fewer investors, and may be associated with a severe lack of liquidity. Therefore,
investors may demand a higher expected on these stocks. However, long-term investors are at
advantage and can earn a premium on illiquid stocks since they can depreciate the illiquidity
costs.
If the advertising effect is indeed a consequence of this mispricing, it would be most
pronounced among the most illiquid stocks and should disappear among stocks with a high
level of liquidity. However, liquidity is relatively hard to quantify. We follow prior research
and use the following measures as proxies for liquidity: past month average closing price,
bid-ask spread (the difference between the bid price and the ask price divided by the average
of the two), trading volume (the dollar value of trades for a stock averaged over all days in a
given year), and the Amihud (2002)’s illiquidity ratio.24 Low-priced stocks are considered to
be illiquid since the price impact from a given trade can be relatively large. Bid-ask spread
reflects the compensation for inventory risk required by the market-maker. Inventory risk
is the risk of changes in the fundamental that the market-maker must bear for holding the
security until he finds the next buyer. Illiquid stocks are usually associated with a low level
of trading volume because they are traded less frequently in order to avoid a large amount
of transaction costs. The Amihud illiquidity ratio in fact directly measures the price impact
of a trade of a given amount.
24We use the monthly average of the daily Amihud illiquidity ratio in a given month estimated from the
following equation: ILLQitm = |Ritm|/DV olitm, where |Ritm| is the absolute return on stock i on day t of
month m, and DV olitm is stock i’s dollar trading volume on day t of month m.
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The results in Table 2.8 provide rather mixed evidence. As shown in Panel A, sorting
stocks on past month average closing price provides the strongest support for the illiquidity
hypothesis: the magnitude of the advertising effect is largest among low-priced stocks; high-
priced stocks do not exhibit a significant premium.
Sorting stocks on dollar trading volume and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (Panel C and
D) provides less clear evidence. Consistent with the hypothesis, the advertising effect is
insignificant among the most liquid stocks (i.e., stocks with a high level of trading volume
and a low Amihud illiquidity ratio). However, it is strongest among stocks with a medium
level of liquidity. Moreover, the evidence in Panel B is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
Sorting stocks on bid-ask spread results in positive and significant alphas in all three spread
terciles. In fact, the difference in the magnitude of the alpha between the most liquid stocks
(i.e., stocks with a small bid-ask spread) and the most illiquid stocks (i.e., stocks with a large
bid-ask spread) is only 1 basis point per month.
In a nutshell, it seems that the low-advertising premium cannot be explained by the
impediment-to-trade hypothesis. Therefore, the advertising effect is unlikely to represent an
arbitrage opportunity.
2.5.3 Signalling
It is commonly acknowledged that the main consideration for most advertising strategies is
product market demand. By intensive advertising, the firm intend to signal to consumers
that it offers good-quality goods and increase demand for its products. Existing customers
are likely to be reminded of their experience with the firm’s products, and such memory is
most valuable for firms who provide good-quality goods. New customers, on the other hand,
can easily conclude that quality and advertising go hand-by-hand because efficient firms are
more likely to gain from advertising. Indeed, in markets with adverse selection, good firms
must separate themselves from the bad ones, for example, by advertising.25
25A number of earlier studies discuss the signalling role of advertising. For example, Kihlstrom and Riordan
(1984) argue that although there is no direct credible information conveyed in advertising, it may signal
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This signalling role of advertising may have a spillover effect on the capital markets. The
firm is likely to have private information about the true value of its projects, as well as
its products. Investors who can only make inference about firm value face a classic adverse
selection problem. However, they are also likely to be exposed to product market advertising,
which in turn may signal the firm’s true value and lead to a correct valuation of the firm.
In a recent study, Chemmanur and Yan (2009) provide empirical evidence that advertising
may signal firm value in the short run and managers are likely to increase product market
advertising spending prior to new equity issues to mitigate equity underpricing.
To put it simply, firms with good future prospects are more likely to invest in advertising.
These firms probably know that the return on advertising is greater for them and intensive
advertising is perhaps a good way to differentiate themselves from the other firms. Further-
more, good firms may also be more efficient and therefore more likely to afford an expensive
advertising campaign.
If the signalling theory can explain the advertising effect, we would observe that the
advertising effect in the contemporaneous year is most pronounced among firms who are most
financially constrained. These firms are likely to experience difficulties in securing financing
and have to make careful investment decisions. Investors may believe that only the ones with
great future prospects and growth opportunities are willing to invest in advertising. Put
differently, financially constrained firms who also advertise intensively may be regarded by
investors as the “good” type. Intuitively, bad firms with a high degree of financial constraint
are more likely to be cash constrained, and are therefore much less likely to use advertising as
a costly signal. If investors take into account the private information conveyed in advertising,
firms with intensive advertising are likely to be priced correctly. On the other hand, financially
constrained firms who do not advertise are more likely to be undervalued by investors.
We use two popular proxies for financial constraints, the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales
quality in the short run. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) also find that seemingly uninformative advertising
may be used as a signal for the unobservable quality of an experience good, such as health care and a bottle
of wine.
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(1997)) and the WW index (Whited and Wu (2006)) to perform the analysis.26 The results
are presented in Table 2.9. In the first four columns, we find evidence against the signalling
hypothesis by examining the advertising effect in the contemporaneous year. Stocks are first
sorted on one of the indexes and then on the change in ad spending in the contemporaneous
year. Note that the strategy longs stocks with high growth in ad expense and shorts stocks
with low growth in ad expense. We find that the magnitude of the premium is largest among
firms with a low degree of financial constraints (53 basis points per month when sorting firms
on the KZ index and 42 basis points when sorting firms on the WW index). The advertising
effect barely exists among stocks with medium and high degrees of financial constraints.
We also investigate the advertising effect in the subsequent year in the next four columns.
Interestingly, although the advertising effect is significant among all three degrees of financial
constraints, it is strongest among firms with a high degree of financial constraints (84 basis
points per month for the KZ index and 79 basis points for the WW index). The difference in
the magnitude is relatively very small between the low- and medium-degree groups (6 basis
points per month for the KZ index and 2 basis points for the WW index). In addition, we
can confirm that the advertising effect is caused by stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the previous year (stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous
year do not exhibit significant alphas). Perhaps financially constrained firms who also do
not advertise may be considered more risky by investors and need to offer a higher return
to compensate the risk. The premium of the advertising-based strategy may simply be a
compensation for risk not captured by the standard risk factors. Overall, we find that the
advertising effect is consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis. It is inconsistent
with the signalling theory, and perhaps cannot be explained the illiquidity hypothesis.
26We use the equation in Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) to compute the KZ index.
33
2.6 Robustness Check
In this section, we investigate whether our results are robust to a regulation change in 1994
which requires the costs of advertising to be expensed as incurred or the first time the ad-
vertising takes place. Before this change, firms could either expense or capitalize advertising
costs. Specifically, we divide the sample into two periods, 1974-1993 and 1996-2012.
Table 2.10 reports the profits of the advertising-based portfolio in the two periods. During
the period from 1974 to 1993, the abnormal return remains significant after controlling for
various risk factors and the magnitude is fairly large (44 basis points per month). The
magnitude of the advertising effect is even larger from during the period from 1996 to 2012
(69 basis points per month).
Table 2.11 reports the excess returns for both the long legs and the short legs for the
strategy in both periods. The results are similar to that in Table 2.3 in that the trading
profit of the advertising-based strategy largely comes from the long position (i.e., stocks
with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year). In other words, stocks that
are more likely to be neglected by investors earn a significant premium, which leads to the
observed advertising effect. This is in line with the investor recognition hypothesis that
investors require a higher expected return on less recognized stocks to compensate for their
undiversified position.
In addition, we use different formation approaches to construct a zero-investment portfolio
to investigate the robustness of the analysis. Specifically, we form a quintile portfolio as well
as a decile portfolio based on growth in advertising expense. The strategy longs stocks with
low growth in advertising spending in the previous year and shorts stocks with high growth
in advertising spending in the previous year, as before.
The trading profits for the quintile portfolio and the decile portfolio are reported in Table
2.12 and Table 2.13, respectively. The abnormal returns are both economically large and
statistically significant after controlling for standard risk factors: 73 basis points per month
(t=4.65) for the quintile portfolio and 108 basis points per month (t=4.03) for the decile
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portfolio. Further, we find that for both portfolios, the short leg does not exhibit significant
alphas. The advertising effect is largely due to the premium earned by stocks with low growth
in advertising expense in the previous year.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the relationship between advertising and the cross-section of stock
returns. We show that a strategy that longs stocks with low growth in advertising expense in
the previous year and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous
year earns a significant premium. For example, after controlling for standard risk factors,
such as size, value, momentum, and liquidity, an advertising-based tercile portfolio can earn
up to 0.55% per month, or 6.6% per year. The observed advertising effect is caused by stocks
with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year, who earn an abnormally high
return. Stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous year, on the other
hand, do not exhibit significant alphas. It seems that stocks with low growth in advertising
expense are more likely to be neglected, and investors may demand a higher premium to
compensate for their undiversified positions.
We find that the advertising effect is closely related to the Merton (1987)’s investor
recognition hypothesis. By sorting stocks on proxies of investor recognition (i.e., analyst
coverage and institutional ownership), we show that the advertising effect is much weaker
among stocks with a high degree of investor recognition (stocks with high analyst coverage
and stocks with a high percentage of institutional ownership). Therefore, advertising is likely
to improve investor recognition, even if it does not convey any genuine information about
the firm’s future prospect.
We also show that the advertising effect is unlikely to be a consequence of mispricing. If
it were, the low-advertising premium would have disappeared among liquid stocks. However,
by sorting stocks by liquidity measures (i.e., price, bid-ask spread, dollar trading volume, and
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the Amihud illiquidity ratio), we do not find supporting evidence. For example, sorting stocks
on bid-ask spread results in significant alphas in all three spread scales and the difference
in the magnitudes is very small. Finally, we find that advertising does not have a signalling
role in the stock market. We find that the advertising effect in the contemporaneous year
is strongest among stocks with a low degree of financial constraints (i.e., the KZ index and
the WW index). It barely exists among stocks with medium and high degrees of financial
constraints. In addition, we find that the advertising effect in the subsequent year is strongest
among stocks with a high degree of financial constraints. The abnormal return is caused by
stocks with low growth in advertising expense in the previous year, who exhibit significant
positive alphas. Perhaps financially constrained firms who do not advertise may be considered
more risky by investors and need to offer a higher return to compensate the risk. The premium
of the advertising-based strategy may simply be a compensation for risk not captured by the
standard risk factors.
To conclude, we find that product market advertising has a significant spillover effect on
the stock market. Stocks with high growth in advertising spending may subsequently under-
perform stocks with low growth in advertising spending. Although advertising usually does
not provide useful information about firm performance, it can improve investor recognition
and reduce the degree of information asymmetries between the firm and investors.
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Appendix
Computation of the KZ Index
In this section, we provide details on the computation of the Kaplan-Zingales index (Kaplan
and Zingales (1997)). Specifically, we use the equation in Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo
(2001) and Giroud and Mueller (2012) to measure the KZ index:
KZ = −1.001909× Cash F low/PPE + 0.2826389× Tobin′s Q
+3.139193×Debt/Total Capital − 39.3678×Dividend/PPE
−1.314759× Cash/PPE,
where all variables on the right-hand side are obtained from the annual Compustat and the
CRSP files. Cash F low is depreciation and amortization (item #14) plus income before
extraordinary items (item #18), PPE is total (net) property, plant, and equipment (item
#8), Tobin′s Q is total assets (item #6) plus CRSP December market equity minus the book
value of total common equity (item #60) minus deferred taxes (item #74) over total assets
(item #6), Debt is total long-term debt (item #9) plus total debt in current liabilities (item
#34), Total Capital is total long-term debt (item #9) plus total debt in current liabilities
(item #34) plus total stockholders’ equity (item #216), Dividend is dividends on preferred
shares (item #19) plus dividends on common equity (item #21), and Cash is cash and
short-term investments (item #1). Note that PPE is lagged by one year.
Computation of the WW Index
We also use the Whited-Wu index as a proxy for financial constraints in Section 2.5.3. Note
that the index is calculated on a quarterly basis and we use the annualized WW index to
perform the regressions.
The WW index is a linear combination of cash flow to total assets, dividend policy
indicator, long-term debt to total assets, log of total assets, the firm’s industry sales growth,
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and the firm’s sales growth. We follow Whited and Wu (2006) to compute the index:
WW = −0.091× Cash F low/Total Assets− 0.062×DIV POS
+0.021× LT Debt/Total Assets− 0.044× Log (Total Assets)
+0.102× Industry Sales Growth− 0.035× Sales Growth,
where all variables on the right-hand side are from the quarterly Compustat file. Cash F low
is total depreciation and amortization (item #5) plus income before extraordinary items
(item #8), Total Assets is the replacement value of total assets (item #44) as in Whited
(1992), DIV POS is an indicator variable which takes value of 1 if cash dividends (item #89)
are positive and 0 otherwise, LT Debt is total long-term debt (item #51), Log (Total Assets)
is the natural log of total assets, Industry Sales Growth is the sales growth in the firm’s
3-digit SIC industry, and Sales Growth is the growth in the firm’s sales (item #2).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the firms in our sample. We collect data on advertising expense
(item#45), total assets (item#6), current liabilities (item#5), total liabilities (item#181), net incomes
(item#18) and sales (item#12) from the Industrial Compustat files. Firm age and market capitalization
are constructed from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files. Firm age is the number of
years the firm has been listed on the CRSP file. Market cap is constructed as the year-end closing share price
times the number of shares outstanding.
Firms with Ad Exp Firms without Ad Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev
Current Assets (Million $) 798 66 3,948 527 39 2,898
Total Assets (Million $) 5,177 189 57,445 4,276 119 43,573
Current Liabilities (Million $) 604 31 3,464 432 19 3,080
Total Liability (Million $) 2,251 179 9,311 2,067 221 6,684
Net Income (Million $) 103.7 3.5 1,079.0 82.3 2.1 806.1
Sales (Million $) 2,080 134 10,329 1,506 92 8,439
Firm Age 13.36 9 14.34 13.32 9 14.08
Market Cap (Million $) 2,202 110 12,930 1,329 101 8,712
Ad Expenditure (Million $) 54.8 2.4 290.1
Ad/Sales 0.05 0.02 0.20
Ad/Assets 0.05 0.02 0.11
Growth in Ad 0.29 0.09 0.93
No obs 71,251 186,513
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Table 2.2: Advertising and Stock Returns: Univariate Analysis
This table reports average monthly returns for stocks with low, medium, and high growth in advertising
spending. Firms in our sample are sorted into three advertising portfolios in each month using the most
recent financial data, by percentage changes in advertising expenditures in the previous fiscal year: low,
medium, and high. We report equal-weighted average returns of the three portfolios using monthly returns of
individual stocks in the following month. We also report the return differences for low- and high- portfolios.
In addition, we compute the equal-weighted average return of the advertising portfolios sorted on size, book-
to-market ratio, past 12-month momentum, past month return, and price.
Average Monthly Returns Average No. of Stocks
% Growth in Ad t-Statistics % Growth in Ad
Low Medium High Low-High Low-High Low Medium High
Panel A: All Stocks
0.0193 0.0149 0.0128 0.0065 5.11 431.54 432.22 433.03
Panel B: By Firm Size
Small 0.0283 0.0209 0.0202 0.0082 5.08 137.46 138.11 138.86
Medium 0.0154 0.0139 0.0091 0.0063 4.55 137.70 138.35 139.03
Large 0.0130 0.0122 0.0097 0.0034 1.77 137.89 138.62 139.27
Panel C: By Book-to-Market Ratio
Low 0.0139 0.0114 0.0081 0.0058 2.83 134.05 134.86 135.41
Medium 0.0166 0.0145 0.0128 0.0038 3.51 134.30 135.00 135.73
High 0.0246 0.0185 0.0187 0.0060 4.00 134.54 135.22 136.00
Panel D: By Past Twelve-Month Momentum
Low 0.0207 0.0147 0.0100 0.0107 6.25 131.98 132.62 133.30
Medium 0.0146 0.0134 0.0123 0.0023 2.26 132.16 132.83 133.52
High 0.0224 0.0169 0.0172 0.0053 3.67 132.39 133.07 133.71
Panel E: By Past Month Return
Low 0.0228 0.0188 0.0149 0.0079 4.95 134.82 135.50 136.17
Medium 0.0152 0.0136 0.0117 0.0035 3.19 135.03 135.70 136.38
High 0.0113 0.0095 0.0070 0.0043 3.25 135.28 135.93 136.61
Panel F: By Price
Low 0.0277 0.0204 0.0174 0.0103 5.51 137.84 138.50 139.18
Medium 0.0136 0.0138 0.0097 0.0040 3.34 138.07 138.76 139.40
High 0.0132 0.0124 0.0124 0.0008 0.47 138.28 138.95 139.64
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Table 2.3: Portfolio Alphas
This table reports the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and shorts
stocks with high growth in advertising expenses. Stocks are sorted into three groups in each month using
the most recent financial data, by the percentage change in advertising expenses in the past fiscal year: low,
medium, and high growth. The portfolio then longs stocks with low growth and shorts stocks with high
growth. Note that the long and short positions are equally weighted, and held for one month after portfolio
construction. Portfolio is rebalanced every month. We then report in Panel A the results from regressions
of the resulting time-series portfolio returns on well-known risk-factor models (market factor, Fama-French
(1993) three-factor, Carhart (1997) four-factor, and Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor). Panel B and
C report alphas for the long position and the short position, respectively. Standard errors, corrected for
autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: Portfolio Results
Mkt-rf -0.1020* -0.0114 -0.0127 -0.0137
(0.0540) (0.0249) (0.0220) (0.0225)
SMB -0.0268 -0.0261 -0.0286
(0.0425) (0.0441) (0.0443)
HML 0.4070*** 0.4050*** 0.4040***
(0.0560) (0.0636) (0.0638)
UMD -0.00717 -0.00703
(0.0407) (0.0405)
LIQ -0.0309
(0.0282)
Constant 0.0071*** 0.0052*** 0.0053*** 0.0055***
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
No. of Obs 444 444 444 444
R-squared 0.047 0.358 0.358 0.361
Panel B: Alphas for Long Position
Constant 0.0059*** 0.0048*** 0.0051*** 0.0055***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Panel C: Alphas for Short Position
Constant -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
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Table 2.4: Portfolio Trading Profits: A Closer Look
This table further explores the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth
and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expenses. Stocks are sorted in each month using the most
recent financial data, by the percentage change in advertising expense in the past year. Equal weights are
used in both the long and short legs, and the portfolio is rebalanced every month. Panel A reports the results
from regressing the time-series portfolio returns in the first half of each year (months 1-6) on well-known risk
factors. Panel B reports the results for the strategy in the second half of each year (months 7-12). In Panel
C we investigate whether the results are influenced by the January effect. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: Results for Months 1-6
Mkt-rf -0.0734* 0.0094 -0.0022 -0.0091
(0.0381) (0.0305) (0.0311) (0.0317)
SMB 0.0143 0.0247 0.0219
(0.0388) (0.0391) (0.0392)
HML 0.4860*** 0.4800*** 0.4750***
(0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0416)
UMD -0.0425* -0.0403
(0.0247) (0.0247)
LIQ -0.0378
(0.0339)
Constant 0.0083*** 0.0049*** 0.0051*** 0.0053***
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
No. of Obs 222 222 222 222
R-squared 0.017 0.413 0.421 0.425
Panel B: Results for Months 7-12
Mkt-rf -0.122*** -0.0340 -0.0304 -0.0300
(0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0252)
SMB -0.0705* -0.0691* -0.0697*
(0.0413) (0.0413) (0.0417)
HML 0.3140*** 0.3300*** 0.3310***
(0.0409) (0.0429) (0.0430)
UMD 0.0375 0.0371
(0.0288) (0.0291)
LIQ -0.0037
(0.0308)
Constant 0.0058*** 0.0050*** 0.0045*** 0.0046***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012)
No. of Obs 222 222 222 222
R-squared 0.100 0.309 0.314 0.314
Panel C: Alphas for Portfolio excluding January
Constant 0.0067*** 0.0050*** 0.0052*** 0.0053***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
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Table 2.5: Portfolio Trading Profits by Firm Characteristics
This table explores the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and shorts
stocks with high growth in advertising expenses, sorted on a number of firm characteristics. Stocks are sorted
in each month using the most recent financial data, according to percentage growth in advertising expenses
in the past fiscal year. Note that equal weights are used in both long and short positions, and the portfolio is
rebalanced in each month. We then report alphas from regressing the time series of zero-investment portfolio
returns on various risk-factor models. Standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: By Size
Small 0.0076*** 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0068***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Medium 0.0066*** 0.0051*** 0.0049*** 0.0050***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Large 0.0047** 0.0024* 0.0026* 0.0025*
(0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Panel B: By Book-to-Market
Low 0.0069*** 0.0056*** 0.0052*** 0.0050***
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Medium 0.0041*** 0.0035*** 0.0031*** 0.0031***
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
High 0.0055*** 0.0043*** 0.0043** 0.0047***
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Panel C: By Past 12-Month Momentum
Low 0.0110*** 0.0092*** 0.0089*** 0.0093***
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Medium 0.0026** 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0016
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
High 0.0057*** 0.0039*** 0.0045*** 0.0045***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Panel D: By Past Month Return
Low 0.0085*** 0.0064*** 0.0061*** 0.0062***
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Medium 0.0040*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0030***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
High 0.0049*** 0.0036*** 0.0039*** 0.0038***
(0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
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Table 2.6: Fama-MacBeth (1973) Regressions
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth return regression results. The dependent variable Rett is the monthly
stock return in the year subsequent to the advertising year (t − 1). 4Adv is the percentage change in
advertising spending in the advertising year. Firm size, the book-to-market ratio, firm age, cumulative
stock returns in the advertising year, average monthly turnover in the advertising year, are included in the
multivariate regressions. 4Profits, 4Assets, 4Sales, and 4Capex are changes in the net incomes, total
assets, sales, and capital expenditures in the advertising year. Standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation
with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rett Rett Rett Rett Rett
4Adv -0.374*** -0.294*** -0.325*** -0.304*** -0.306***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.083) (0.079) (0.071)
Size -0.073* -0.064 -0.058 -0.051
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Book-to-Market 0.320*** 0.360*** 0.345*** 0.351***
(0.093) (0.096) (0.094) (0.097)
Firm Age 0.020 0.021 -0.014 -0.025
(0.062) (0.059) (0.050) (0.052)
Cumulative Return 0.036 0.107 0.146
(0.208) (0.190) (0.186)
Turnover -0.027** -0.026**
(0.011) (0.011)
4Income 0.001
(0.003)
4Assets -0.562***
(0.134)
4Sales 0.317
(0.204)
4Capex -0.017
(0.018)
No. of Obs 324,324 324,324 324,324 324,324 324,324
R-squared 0.003 0.029 0.036 0.046 0.057
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Table 2.7: Can Alphas Be Explained by Investor Recognition?
This table examines the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and
shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expenses, sorted on two proxies of investor recognition: analyst
coverage and institutional ownership. Stocks are sorted in each month using the most recent ad spending
data, by the percentage change in advertising expenses in the past year. The long and short positions are
both equally weighted, and held for one month after portfolio construction. Alphas from regressing the time
series of the portfolio returns on various risk-factor models are reported (market factor, Fama-French (1993)
three-factor, Carhart (1997) four-factor, and Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor). Standard errors,
corrected for autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: By Analyst Coverage
No
0.0080*** 0.0061*** 0.0062*** 0.0065***
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Low
0.0075*** 0.0064*** 0.0062*** 0.0064***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
High
0.0043*** 0.0026** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Panel B: By Percentage of Institutional Ownership
Low
0.0102*** 0.0094*** 0.0088*** 0.0090***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Medium
0.0095*** 0.0078*** 0.0079*** 0.0079***
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
High
0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
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Table 2.8: Can Alphas Be Explained by the Impediment-to-Trade Hypothesis?
This table examines the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and
shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expenses, sorted on a number of proxies of impediments to
trade: past month average closing price, past month closing bid-ask spread, dollar trading volume (value of
daily trades averaged across all days in a year), and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio. Stocks are sorted in
each month using the most recent ad spending data, by the percentage change in advertising expenses in
the past year. Equal weights are used in both long and short positions. Alphas from regressing the time
series of the portfolio returns on various risk-factor models are reported (market factor, Fama-French (1993)
three-factor, Carhart (1997) four-factor, and Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor). Standard errors,
corrected for autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: By Price
Low 0.0102*** 0.0088*** 0.0081*** 0.0084***
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Medium 0.0049*** 0.0036*** 0.0033*** 0.0032***
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
High 0.0020 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Panel B: By Bid-Ask Spread
Low 0.0087*** 0.0070*** 0.0075*** 0.0076***
(0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Medium 0.0081*** 0.0058*** 0.0054*** 0.0055***
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018)
High 0.0093*** 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0077***
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Panel C: By Trading Volume
Low 0.0066*** 0.0056*** 0.0052*** 0.0055***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Medium 0.0110*** 0.0094*** 0.0093*** 0.0094***
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
High 0.0048** 0.0022 0.0025 0.0024
(0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Panel D: By Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio
Low 0.0035** 0.0013 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Medium 0.0103*** 0.0085*** 0.0083*** 0.0084***
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
High 0.0084*** 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0074***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)
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Table 2.10: Portfolio Trading Profits in Subsamples
This table examines the profitability of the zero-investment portfolio in two subsamples. A regulation (State-
ment of Position 93-7) was introduced in 1994 on reporting advertising costs. We therefore exclude years
1994 and 1995 and divide the entire sample into two subsamples: Years 1974-1993 and Years 1996-2012.
Stocks are sorted in each month using the most recent advertising cost data, by the growth in advertising
expenses in the past year. The long and short positions are both equally weighted, and held for a month
after portfolio construction. Results for the two subsamples from regressing the time series of the portfolio
returns on various risk-factor models are then reported in Panel A and B. Standard errors, corrected for
autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: 1974-1993
Mkt-rf -0.0971*** -0.0215 -0.0114 -0.0110
(0.0254) (0.0187) (0.0193) (0.0191)
SMB 0.0688 0.0712 0.0724
(0.0593) (0.0590) (0.0608)
HML 0.3460*** 0.3320*** 0.3310***
(0.0463) (0.0481) (0.0485)
UMD -0.0779** -0.0781**
(0.0351) (0.0350)
LIQ 0.0037
(0.0267)
Constant 0.0060*** 0.0037*** 0.0044*** 0.0044***
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
No. of Obs 216 216 216 216
R-squared 0.071 0.331 0.354 0.354
Panel B: 1996-2012
Mkt-rf -0.1060 -0.0203 -0.0146 -0.010
(0.1060) (0.0492) (0.0406) (0.0408)
SMB -0.0611 -0.0635 -0.0632
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0590)
HML 0.4370*** 0.4410*** 0.4370***
(0.0797) (0.0862) (0.0894)
UMD 0.0129 0.0147
(0.0487) (0.0485)
LIQ -0.0454
(0.0396)
Constant 0.0080*** 0.0066*** 0.0065*** 0.0069***
(0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021)
No. of Obs 192 192 192 192
R-squared 0.038 0.398 0.399 0.403
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Table 2.11: Alphas for Long and Short Positions in Subsamples
This table reports the alphas for the long leg and the short leg of the zero-investment portfolio in two
subsamples. A regulation (Statement of Position 93-7) was introduced in 1994 on reporting advertising costs.
We therefore exclude years 1994 and 1995 and divide the entire sample into two subsamples: Years 1974-1993
and Years 1996-2012. Stocks are sorted in each month using the most recent advertising cost data, by the
growth in advertising expenses in the past year. The long and short positions are both equally weighted,
and held for one month after portfolio construction. Reported numbers are alphas for both the long legs
and the short legs in the two subsamples by regressing the time series of returns on a number of risk-factor
models. Standard errors, corrected for autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: Alphas for Long Position in 1974-1993
Constant 0.0050*** 0.0040*** 0.0050*** 0.0050***
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Panel B: Alphas for Short Position in 1974-1993
Constant -0.0010 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Panel C: Alphas for Long Position in 1996-2012
Constant 0.0067*** 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0066***
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Panel D: Alphas for Short Position in 1996-2012
Constant -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025)
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Table 2.12: Portfolio Alphas: Robustness Checks
This table reports the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and
shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expenses. Stocks are sorted into five groups in each month
using the most recent financial data, by the growth in advertising spending in the past fiscal year. The
portfolio then longs stocks with the lowest growth in ad expense and shorts stocks with the highest growth
in ad expense. Note that the long and short positions are equally weighted, and held for one month after
portfolio construction. Portfolio is rebalanced every month. We then report in Panel A the results from
regressions of the resulting time-series portfolio returns on well-known risk-factor models. Panel B and Panel
C report alphas for the long position and the short position, respectively. Standard errors, corrected for
autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: Portfolio Results
Mkt-rf -0.1270* -0.0197 -0.0153 -0.0159
(0.0688) (0.0348) (0.0304) (0.0308)
SMB -0.0245 -0.0273 -0.0288
(0.0563) (0.0585) (0.0594)
HML 0.4880*** 0.4960*** 0.4950***
(0.0872) (0.0959) (0.0958)
UMD 0.0265 0.0266
(0.0599) (0.0599)
LIQ -0.0192
(0.0425)
Constant 0.0097*** 0.0074*** 0.0072*** 0.0073***
(0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
No. of Obs 444 444 444 444
R-squared 0.030 0.284 0.285 0.286
Panel B: Alphas for Long Position
Constant 0.0074*** 0.0063*** 0.0068*** 0.0072***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Panel C: Alphas for Short Position
Constant -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)
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Table 2.13: Portfolio Alphas: Additional Robustness Checks
This table reports the profitability of a zero-investment strategy that longs stocks with low growth and
shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expenses. Stocks are sorted into ten groups in each month
using the most recent financial data, by the percentage change in advertising expense in the past fiscal year.
The portfolio then longs stocks with the lowest growth in ad expense and shorts stocks with the highest
growth in ad expense. Note that the long and short positions are equally weighted, and held for one month
after portfolio construction. Portfolio is rebalanced every month. We then report in Panel A the results
from regressions of the resulting time-series portfolio returns on well-known risk-factor models. Panel B and
C report alphas for the long position and the short position, respectively. Standard errors, corrected for
autocorrelation with 12 lags, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-Factor PS Liquidity
Panel A: Portfolio Results
Mkt-rf -0.1400* -0.0355 -0.0224 -0.0239
(0.0818) (0.0503) (0.0412) (0.0418)
SMB 0.0376 0.0293 0.0257
(0.0904) (0.0869) (0.0872)
HML 0.5260*** 0.5500*** 0.5480***
(0.1170) (0.1150) (0.1160)
UMD 0.0777 0.0779
(0.0687) (0.0688)
LIQ -0.0451
(0.0601)
Constant 0.0137*** 0.0112*** 0.0105*** 0.0108***
(0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)
No. of Obs 444 444 444 444
R-squared 0.028 0.183 0.192 0.193
Panel B: Alphas for Long Position
Constant 0.0091*** 0.0083*** 0.0090*** 0.0095***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Panel C: Alphas for Short Position
Constant -0.0046 -0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0013
(0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
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Chapter 3
Advertising, the Stock Market Crisis,
and Firm Risk
Summary
We find that advertising is related to firm risk and the 2008-2009 stock market crisis
had an important impact on the relationship. Specifically, advertising was associated with a
reduction in idiosyncratic risk during the crisis. Firms with higher advertising expenditure
had higher idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but not during the crisis. On the other hand, we
find that advertising is likely to be negatively related to systematic risk, particularly during
the crisis. Our results support the view that advertising may influence investors from an
attention perspective. Advertising is likely to attract individual investors by relaxing their
attention constraints. Although institutional investors are less likely to face a formidable
search problem in the stock market, advertising may also attract them and encourage private
information collection. Our results are robust to alternative measures of risk.
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3.1 Introduction
Firms spend billions of dollars on advertising each year.1 According to business professionals,
advertising may create demand for the firm’s products by convincing the audience that such
products are of good quality, and result in higher sales and a larger market share. Indeed,
a number of studies find that advertising improves firm performance in the product market
by forming barriers to entry and creating consumer loyalty. However, while the importance
of advertising in the product market has been generally recognized, less attention is paid to
study its consequences on the capital markets. In this paper, we contribute to the literature
by examining the link between advertising and firm risk.
Several studies find that advertising has a significant influence on investors. For example,
Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) provide empirical evidence that firms with greater
advertising expenditure have a larger number of both individual and institutional investors,
and consequently better liquidity of common stocks. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether
advertising has an important impact on firm risk, particularly idiosyncratic risk and this
issue is the focus of our paper. We find that advertising was associated with a reduction in
idiosyncratic risk during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. Firms with higher advertising
expenditure had higher idiosyncratic risk in normal times but not during the crisis. Further,
we find that advertising is negatively related to systematic risk if missing values on advertising
spending are treated as zero.
The negative relationship between advertising and systematic risk perhaps can be ex-
plained by the nature of product market advertising. Advertising undoubtedly provides
valuable intangible assets which may protect the firm from market fluctuations and reduce
its earnings volatility, and hence the negative relationship between advertising and firm risk.
However, this does not explain the relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic risk.
Specifically, we argue that advertising may reduce the degree of information asymmetries
1100 biggest advertisers in the U.S. spent an astonishing $109 billion on advertisements in 2013. Among
them are Microsoft, JPMorgan Chase, Toyota, and Proctor & Gamble.
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between the firm and investors through different channels, which may lead to better knowl-
edge about the firm’s current performance and future prospects. If investors weigh such
information in making investment decisions, the firm’s stock may be less sensitive to market
fluctuations such as market downturns. On the other hand, investors attracted by advertis-
ing may vigorously collect private information about the firm which is impounded into stock
prices, and hence the positive relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic risk.
This paper is closely related to the literature on investor limited attention. As argued
by Barber and Odean (2008), when making important decisions, people usually choose a
selection of options to consider and subsequently decide which of these options to take. If
there are many alternatives, options that attract attention are more likely to be considered.
For example, when PhD students start their research, they may feel that it is very difficult
to choose a topic. They are likely to first consider an area in which they are interested, and
then make a decision on which specific topic within that area to pursue.
Different types of market participants certainly do not face the same attention constraints
due to the difference in their capacity for processing information. For example, there are thou-
sands of shares available in the stock market and investors potentially face a search problem
when considering which shares to buy. Particularly, individual investors have limited capac-
ity for processing information and simply do not have enough resource or energy to evaluate
every security. Thus, when purchasing stocks, these investors may limit their choices to firms
that grab their attention to address this formidable search problem. Given that advertising
grabs attention and increases familiarity, attention-constrained investors may give preference
to firms that advertise intensively.2 To put it simply, the buying behavior of individual in-
vestors is likely to be influenced by advertising. Moreover, individual investors tend to rely
heavily on non-financial information in making investment decisions.3 For example, they are
2There are good reasons to believe that advertising attracts investor attention. Investors encounter ad-
vertisements almost everywhere (e.g., when they watch TV, read newspapers, and surf the internet), and are
therefore likely to become familiar with and interested in the firm.
3For example, Barber and Odean (2011) document that individual investors are heavily influenced by past
return performance in purchase decisions and may engage in naive reinforcement learning.
54
likely to be affected by cognitive biases such as the mere-exposure effect, also known as the
familiarity principle, which is a psychological phenomenon that people may show an undue
liking for familiar things and exhibit a home bias.
In contrast to individual investors, professional investors are less likely to face the same
search problem since they are more resourceful in making investment decisions. For example,
institutions are more likely to implement comprehensive trading strategies with the aid of
computers. They are also likely to concentrate on a particular industry which significantly
reduces the number of stocks to consider. Nonetheless, this does not imply that institutional
investors have unlimited attention. They are also vulnerable to a perhaps less severe search
problem. For example, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2015) argue that
mutual fund managers also have limited attention and should rationally allocate this limited
resource over the business cycle. Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) find that stocks covered by
media are more heavily bought by mutual funds. Therefore, it would be somewhat surprising
if advertising does not have any effect on institutional investors as they are also exposed to
advertising. Advertisements in financial media (e.g., the Financial Times and the Wall Street
Journal) are perhaps intentionally targeted at these investors.
Indeed, prior studies find that advertising may signal quality in the product market
and this signalling role of advertising may have a spillover effect in the capital market due
to the interaction between the two markets (e.g., Nelson (1974), Kihlstrom and Riordan
(1984), and Chemmanur and Yan (2009)). Institutional investors may be attracted to firms
with extensive advertising in that advertising may signal the firm’s private information.
On one hand, advertising may convey information about product quality to consumers and
allow them to price the product correctly. On the other hand, the firm may use product
market advertising to signal its private information about firm value to investors to mitigate
information asymmetries between the firm and investors, even if the value of its products is
not related with the value of its projects.4 In a nutshell, institutional investors may also be
4Managers use various corporate financial decisions to signal their private information to the financial
market (e.g., dividend policy, management share ownership, and capital structure decisions). See, for ex-
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influenced by advertising, but perhaps not to the same extent as individual investors since
the former face a less severe attention constraint.
Furthermore, advertising may more or less provide information that is relevant to in-
vestors, for example, in corporate advertising where usually no product or service but the
firm itself is mentioned.5 In fact, advertisements in financial media such as the Wall Street
Journal, the Money Magazine, the Barron’s, and the Financial Times, are often targeted at
investors. Even if the information conveyed in advertising is value-irrelevant and absolutely
uninformative about the firm’s future prospect, advertising can attract valuable attention for
the firm. Investors may be impressed by what they see in the advertisements and become
interested in the firm. If they believe that the firm is potentially a good investment, they may
perform adequate research by acquiring costly firm-specific information. This information
may give investors insight into the firm’s current financial performance as well as its growth
opportunities. Therefore, the firm may benefit from advertising by having lower sensitiv-
ity to market risk if investors take into account such information when making investment
decisions.
Advertising may also have an important impact on the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Idiosyn-
cratic risk is a regarded as an aggregate measure of firm-specific information and indicates
how informative the share price is (e.g., Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004)). As argued by
Roll (1988), private information is more likely to be related to the firm rather than the over-
all market, and idiosyncratic risk should reflect the incorporation of private information into
stock prices rather than public information. Put differently, stocks with higher idiosyncratic
risk may contain more private information about earnings.
On one hand, individual investors may pay more attention to market-level information
than firm-level fundamental information since they are more prone to the attention constraint
ample, Brealey, Leland, and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Miller and Rock (1985), and Gertner, Gibbons, and
Scharfstein (1988).
5Many mutual funds also use advertising to attract investors. Jain and Wu (2000) find that compared
with a group of control funds, advertising funds attract significantly more money but do not necessarily
exhibit superior performance after the advertising period.
56
(Peng and Xiong (2006)). These investors are also less likely to have the capacity to acquire,
let alone the capacity to evaluate relatively costly firm-specific information. On the other
hand, institutional investors are more likely to collect costly private information about the
firm because they depend on such information to understand the firm’s business and cor-
rectly evaluate its value. If institutional investors are indeed interested in firms with high
advertising expenditure, we would observe a positive relationship between advertising and
idiosyncratic risk. However, as collecting private information is a rather costly process, insti-
tutional investors are also likely to consider the cost-benefit trade-off of this action. During
the stock market crisis, investor sentiment is likely to be lower and the degree of informa-
tion asymmetries may be higher as liquidity dries out. Institutional investors may also be
occupied by market-wide events. Therefore, the cost of collecting private information may
be relatively higher and it may not be worthwhile for institutional investors to do so. Thus,
the positive relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic risk may disappear during the
stock market crisis.
Indeed, we find that firms with higher advertising expenditure had higher idiosyncratic
risk in normal times, even after controlling for other firm characteristics that may be corre-
lated with firm risk, such as size, growth (the log change in total assets), leverage, liquidity
(the ratio of current assets to current liabilities), earnings variability, firm age, and the divi-
dend payout ratio. However, the relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic was less
significant during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. In fact, advertising is likely to be neg-
atively related to idiosyncratic risk during such time, which is rather difficult to interpret.
In addition, we find that advertising is negatively related to systematic risk after we treat
missing values on advertising spending as zero.
We also introduce an interaction effect between CRISIS and advertising in the regres-
sions, where CRISIS is a variable indicating the stock market crisis, to further study the
effect of advertising on firm risk conditional on the stock market crisis taking place.6 The
6We use the ratio of advertising spending to sales to purge firm fixed effects.
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negative coefficient on the interaction effect indicates that the stock market crisis may have
an impact on the relationship between advertising and systematic risk. Moreover, we examine
the relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic risk and find that the coefficient on the
interaction effect between CRISIS and advertising is negative and highly significant, which
implies that the crisis had an important impact on idiosyncratic risk. The results remain
the same when we use different measures of market returns (i.e., equal- and value-weighted
market returns) and numbers of firm-level returns to compute systematic and idiosyncratic
risk.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 estimates systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Section
5 presents the regression results. Section 6 provides results for robustness checks where we
use alternative methods to estimate systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature
It is generally acknowledged that most advertisements, whether on TV, in the newspapers,
or on the internet, are essentially a form of communication which conveys information about
products and services to consumers. Firms use advertising to seek recognition of their prod-
ucts and businesses by making them better known to the consumers.
However, advertising may also improve firm recognition and even lead the audience to
believe that it has good growth opportunities, because only firms with good future prospects
can afford expensive advertising campaigns. Thus, advertising may increase the visibility
and enhances the image of the firm. For example, many firms utilize corporate advertising
in which they do not identify any product or business but themselves, potentially to seek
recognition beyond the product markets and perhaps in the stock market. Actually, adver-
tisements also appear regularly in financial media (e.g., the Financial Times, the Wall Street
Journal, and the Economist) whose target audiences are both financial industry professionals
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and individual investors.
3.2.1 Advertising and the Product Market
Our paper contributes to the literature on the economics of advertising. For decades, aca-
demics have studied the important effects of advertising in the product markets. A body of
studies focus on its direct effects on firm performance measures, such as sales growth, mar-
ket shares and profits. This stream of research finds that advertising creates market-based
intangible assets (e.g., distribution channels, partner channels, and consumer loyalties), and
therefore may help firms establish competitive advantages in the product markets and allow
them to earn higher profits.7
Researchers have also investigated other channels through which advertising can impact
the product markets, and more specifically, how it interacts with consumers. For example,
Nelson (1974) shows that information conveyed in advertising is direct for search goods
(i.e., about products) and indirect for experience goods (i.e., about brands). Kihlstrom
and Riordan (1984) argue that although advertising does not necessarily convey credible
information about product quality, it may indirectly signal quality if there exists a market
mechanism such that product quality and advertising expenditure are positively related.
Other studies that consider the signalling role of advertising include Stigler (1961), Telser
(1964), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and Bagwell and Ramey
(1994). In this paper, we argue that advertising has a spillover effect in the capital markets
by reducing informational frictions between the firm and investors.
3.2.2 Advertising and the Capital Market
Our study is closely related to the growing literature on the effects of advertising in the
capital market, particularly on shareholder wealth. For example, Rao and Bharadwaj (2008)
7See, for example, Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998), Erickson and Jacobson (1992), Tirole (1988),
and Sutton (1991).
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find that marketing actions, including advertising, can reduce the firm’s cash needs. These
actions can also increase operating efficiency, and consequently the probability of a long-term
success and shareholder wealth. Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) argue that advertising has
a positive impact on brand equity, customer satisfaction, R&D, and product quality, and
therefore creates shareholder value. Joshi and Hanssens (2010) relate the product market
response of marketing actions in two industries to investor response and find that it has a
direct effect on firm size. Pauwels, Silva-Risso, Srinivasan, and Hanssens (2004) also find
that advertising increases long-term financial performance and firm value for top-line firms
in the automobile industry.
In a similar vein, Osinga, Leeflang, Srinivasan, and Wieringa (2011) study two types of
pharmaceutical advertising (direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) and direct-to-physician
(DTP) marketing) and find that both DTCA and DTP have positive effects on stock returns.
More interestingly, they find that DTCA is associated with lower systematic risk, but leads
to higher idiosyncratic risk. McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007) also find that firms
listed on the NYSE with high advertising and R&D expenditure have low systematic risk in
the subsequent year. In contrast to the aforementioned studies which focus on the product
market and argue that advertising and R&D may create valuable intangible assets such as
brand equity, and therefore can protect firms from stock market fluctuations, we investigate
the relationship between advertising and systematic risk from the capital market perspective
and do not limit our analysis to a specific industry.
3.2.3 Idiosyncratic Risk
Another stream of research focuses on the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and pri-
vate information. For example, Roll (1988) provides empirical evidence that idiosyncratic
volatility reflects private information being impounded into stock prices by informed trading.
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) also find that higher firm-specific return vari-
ation indicates more information about future earnings and more informative stock prices.
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Actually, a growing body of accounting literature illustrates that firms may use managerial
disclosures to affect investors’ assessment of the firm’s idiosyncratic risk as they are likely
to take into account the acquired private information when making evaluating the firm (see,
for example, Chen, Huang, and Jha (2012), Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie (2004), and Lam-
bert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012)). In a more recent study, Ferreira and Laux (2007) find
that stocks with fewer antitakeover provisions exhibit higher idiosyncratic risk, perhaps be-
cause institutional investors are likely to be interested in such firms and engage in private
information collection.
We argue that product market advertising may have different impacts on different in-
vestors (i.e., individual investors and institutional investors). Specifically, we show that
product market advertising has a spillover effect in the capital market and may protect the
firm from market fluctuations by having lower systematic risk. In addition, we show that
advertising was positively related to idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but associated with
a reduction in idiosyncratic risk during the 2008-2009 crisis. Our paper perhaps also lends
support to the literature on behavioral patterns of investors which find that compared to
individual investors, professional investors are more likely to engage in logic thinking and
rely on fundamental information when making investment decisions.8
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Sample Selection
Our sample consists of common stocks listed on the AMEX, the NASDAQ, and the NYSE
(with share code 10 or 11 on the CRSP database) during the period from 2003 to 2012. Data
on firm characteristics are collected from the Compustat annual file and firms with missing
advertising expenditure information are removed. However, we compare the two subsample
of firms with and without non-missing advertising spending data and show that our sample is
8For example, see Barber and Odean (2000), Benartzi (2001), and Coval and Moskowitz (2001).
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relatively unbiased from the universe of Compustat firms. Similar to Grullon, Kanatas, and
Weston (2004), we focus our analysis on firms with non-missing advertising expenditure. Data
on firm-level stock returns, and equal- and value-weighted market returns are obtained from
the CRSP daily database in order to compute both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. We
then merge the files to obtain the final sample of firms that have available data on advertising
spending in the Compustat database and on daily returns in the CRSP database. To ensure
that our results are not driven by small and illiquid stocks or bid-ask bounce, we exclude
shares that are priced below $1. This process generates a final sample of 10,628 firm-year
observations over the period 2003-2012. There are 8,714 and 1,968 firm-year observations for
the period over 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009 and 2008-2009, respectively.
From 2003 to 2012, more than 41% firms provided advertising expenditure information in
their annual reports. The percentage is higher than that reported by Lou (2014), who finds
that less than 35% firms did so in a horizon from 1974 to 2010. Further, among firms with
non-missing advertising expenditure data in our sample, only 47 or less than 0.5% firm-year
observations were associated with zero advertising expenditure, which is substantially lower
than that in Lou (2014).
This change potentially shows that more firms realize the value of advertising and engage
in various marketing actions. Indeed, with the rapid advancement of technology and the
emergence of online advertising, firms may now find it easier to convey relevant information
to potential consumers. But firms do not identify expense for different marketing actions
(e.g., promotions, product marketing, and corporate advertising), nor do they report where
the firms advertise (e.g., television, newspaper, radio, and the internet) in their financial
statements, and therefore it is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain relevant data. In this
paper, we do not examine whether advertising has become more efficient due to technology
changes (e.g., which type of advertisements are most trusted).
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3.3.2 Variable Definitions
We collect data on advertising expenditure (item#45) from the Compustat annual database.
It is normally regarded as a selling expense and defined as costs of promotion and advertising
in various media (e.g., prints including magazines, books, and newspapers, mobile phones,
television, radio, movies, video games, music, and the Internet). In order to compute mea-
sures that may impact systematic and idiosyncratic risk, we also collect data on current
assets (item#4), total assets (item#6), current liabilities (item#5), total long-term debts
(item#9), preferred stocks (item#10), sales (item#12), income before extraordinary items
(item#20), cash dividends for common stocks (item#21), closing price (item#24), and the
number of outstanding common shares (item#25) from the Compustat database. Data on
firm-level stock returns, and equal- and value-weighted market returns are obtained from the
CRSP daily database. Details on the computation of systematic and idiosyncratic risk will
be provided in Section 4.
Figure 3.1: Total Market Value for American Firms.
This figure graphs the total market capitalization for all the U.S. firms that are constituents of the AMEX, the NASDAQ, and
the NYSE from 01/2007 to 12/2010. Data are collected from the CRSP database.
The most recent major financial crisis began as early as in 2008 and the U.S. stock market
meltdown occurred in the same year. It was triggered by the failure of several major banks,
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and did not fully recover until late 2010, as shown in Figure 3.1.9 Since the focus of this paper
is the relation between advertising and firm risk during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis,
we divide the sample into two sub periods (i.e., normal times and the stock market crisis):
2003-2012 excluding year 2008-2009 (the first time period), and 2008-2009 (the second time
period).
In the following analysis, we first investigate whether there is a significant relationship
between advertising and systematic risk during normal times, and then proceed to investigate
the relationship during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. The variable of interest is the one-
year lagged ratio of advertising expense to sales. In addition, we introduce an interaction
term between advertising and a dummy variable indicating the stock market crisis in the
regressions to study the effect of advertising on systematic risk conditional on the stock
market crisis taking place. Finally, we turn to the relationship between advertising and
idiosyncratic risk.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample. Panel A reports the descriptive
statistics for firms with non-missing and missing advertising expense information over the
period 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009, and Panel B over the period 2008-2009. In both
periods, firms with non-missing advertising spending data are larger than those with missing
advertising spending data in terms of total assets, sales, income, and market capitalization.
For example, the average market capitalization for the former in normal times was 5246
million dollars, while it was 3324 million dollars for the latter. The former are also slightly
younger than the latter. In normal times, the average firm age was 18.15 for firms with
non-missing advertising expense data, and 20.45 for firms with missing advertising expense
data. This is perhaps because mature firms are more likely to have established visibility
and therefore can cut advertising without damaging their reputation, while younger firms
9For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit the pre-crisis peak on October 09, 2007, closing at
14,164. It had fallen more than 50% to 6,469 on March 06, 2009.
64
are probably still struggling to improve recognition in the product market or in the capital
market. The percentages of advertising firms during both periods of time are very similar:
about 42% firms reported non-missing advertising spending data. In fact, the percentage
increased by about 1% in the sample that spans the period 2008-2009. The percentage of
firms that report zero advertising costs also remained the same. Therefore, the 2008-2009
stock market crash did not seem to have a strong impact on firms’ advertising policies.
It is worth noting that during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis, firms on average earned
significantly less and the average market capitalization was a great deal lower than that in
normal times. This is in accordance with the deteriorating economy affected by the financial
crisis. However, it seems that the crisis did not have a significant effect on firms’ advertising
spending. The average advertising expense was 105 million dollars over the period 2008-2009
and 96.27 million dollars in normal times. Average advertising expense actually increased in
each year from 2003 to 2012 except in 2004 and 2009, as shown in Table 3.2. However, due to
increased sales, the average (median) ratio of advertising expense to sales decreased slightly
in 2012 compared to 2003 (from 0.033 to 0.026).
(a) Year 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009 (b) Year 2008-2009
Figure 3.2: Industry Distribution for Advertising and Non-Advertising Firms
This figure depicts the industry distribution of firm-year observations with non-missing and missing advertising expense data
over the two time periods, using the Fama-French 10-industry classification.
Industry may also play an important role on firms’ advertising policies. For example,
the biggest advertisers are often from consumer product and high-tech industries. Figure
3.2 depicts the industry distribution for both advertising and non-advertising firms during
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normal times and the stock market crisis, where we adopt the Fama-French 10-industry clas-
sification.10 In general, the industry distributions of advertising firms are virtually identical
over the two time periods. However, the ratios of the number of firms with non-missing ad-
vertising to that with missing data are very different across industries in both time periods.
Firms in consumer product, business equipment, telecom, retail and wholesale industries are
more likely to report non-missing advertising expense; the figure also shows that energy and
utility firms do not report any advertising expenditure.11 On the other hand, systematic and
idiosyncratic risk is likely to be affected by the firm’s industry classification. For example,
mining and oil firms tend to have low betas. Therefore, we also present regression results
using an industry fixed-effect specification in the analysis.
3.4 Estimation of Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
3.4.1 Systematic Risk
The systematic risk of the firm, also known as its market risk, or the “beta” (β), represents
its stock’s sensitivity to the underlying market risk. Put differently, it measures the stock’s
exposure to the overall market movements. It is an important measure for public firms
because unlike idiosyncratic risk it cannot be mitigated through diversification. Events that
affect the overall market, such as changes in interest rate, recession, and war, will also cause
the firm’s share price to fluctuate. This type of risk is impossible to predict and to completely
avoid. In addition, low beta stocks (i.e., stocks whose betas are lower than 1) are regarded
less volatile than the stock market. Such stocks are less sensitive to market risk and are
usually considered less risky. The return of these stocks in theory fall less than the market
return in response to unfavorable market-wide events. Thus, low beta stocks may provide
valuable protection against falling markets for the investors.12
10Interestingly, Hirschey, Skiba, and Wintoki (2012) find that firms who do not report advertising expen-
diture are truly not advertising. Thus, it is safe to assume that they have zero advertising expenditures.
11The results remain very similar after we use a finer 38-industry industry classification.
12For example, Wal-Mart stock managed a gain in 2008 in spite of a total collapse of the stock market.
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We use the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate systematic risk (β):
ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi(rm,t − rf,t) + i,t, t = 1, ..., T, (3.1)
where ri,t is firm i’s stock return on day t, rm,t is the market return on day t, and rf,t is the
risk-free rate on day t. All data are obtained from the CRSP database.
We use both equal- and value-weighted market returns in the estimation of systematic
risk to ensure that our results are robust. In order to have an accurate estimation of beta,
the final sample only includes firms that have non-missing return data on all trading days
T in any year. As a result, there are 8,714 firm-year observations in the subsample over
the period 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009, and 1,968 observations in the subsample over the
period 2008-2009. However, since we use the lagged ratio of advertising expense to sales, we
may use fewer observations in the analysis.
(a) Year 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009
(b) Year 2008-2009
Figure 3.3: Frequency Distribution for Systematic Risk
This figure contains frequency distributions of systematic risk (beta) for advertising firms, the dependent variable in our regres-
sions. Panel A displays frequency distributions for systematic risk computed from the CAPM using equal- and value-weighted
market returns in the subperiod 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009, respectively. Panel B displays frequency distributions for
systematic risk in the subperiod 2008-2009, respectively.
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Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics for systematic risk in both time periods. The
average beta for advertising firms during the stock market crisis was closer to 1 and lower
than that in normal times; the range and the standard deviation of beta in the second time
period were also smaller than those in the first time period. We then relax the restriction
and impose a requirement that the firm must have non-missing return data for at least 200
days in each year, and we find a similar result, as shown in Panel C and D of Table 3.3.
Interestingly, non-advertising firms tend to have higher correlation with the market and the
difference in the average beta was about 0.05 in both time periods. The average beta for
non-advertising firms also declined considerably in the stock market crisis. Figure 3.3 graphs
the frequency distributions for systematic risk.
3.4.2 Idiosyncratic Risk
In contrast to systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, or firm-specific risk, is related to the firm
itself. For example, an oil firm operating in a politically unstable country may face great
uncertainty regarding its investments; a firm that experience employee strikes may have
rather volatile cash flows and poor earnings. This type of risk is not shared by other firms
or the overall market, and therefore can be mitigated in a well-diversified portfolio. Indeed,
in standard finance theory, only systematic risk matters because idiosyncratic risk can be
eliminated through perfect diversification.
However, according to Merton (1987), the firm may not be known to every investor in the
stock market and idiosyncratic risk can also become undiversifiable. For example, the holder
of a less recognized stock may find it difficult to sell the stock. He will probably spend a great
portion of his time searching for a potential buyer in the stock market and may eventually
sell it at a discount. Thus, when the investor base is limited, idiosyncratic risk should also
be impounded into share prices. In essence, idiosyncratic risk is also an important measure
for the firm because it contributes to the total risk that the investors face and affects the risk
premium that they demand for holding the firm’s stock.
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We use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk in the analysis. That is,
we estimate idiosyncratic risk for firm i as the natural log of the standard deviation of the
residuals i,t from Equation (1). Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics and Figure 3.4
graphs the frequency distribution for idiosyncratic risk.
(a) Year 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009
(b) Year 2008-2009
Figure 3.4: Frequency Distribution for Idiosyncratic Risk
This figure displays frequency distributions of idiosyncratic risk for advertising firms, the dependent variable in our regressions.
Panel A displays frequency distributions for idiosyncratic risk computed from the CAPM using equal- and value-weighted market
returns in the subperiod 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009, respectively. Panel B displays frequency distributions for idiosyncratic
risk in the subperiod 2008-2009, respectively.
It seems that during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis, idiosyncratic risk on average
increased significantly, which may be related to investors’ rational response to the increased
firm-specific uncertainty during the crisis, as suggested by Pástor and Veronesi (2006). This
observation, together with the fact that the average correlation with the market declined
during the crisis, shows that firm-specific information perhaps could play an important role
in investors’ assessment of the total risk of the firm.
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3.5 Results
In this section, we examine the relationship between advertising and systematic risk as well
as idiosyncratic risk. Note that we use a scaled measure of advertising (i.e., the one-year
lagged ratio of advertising spending to sales) rather than the dollar amount in our analysis to
eliminate the potentially confounding effect of uncontrolled firm characteristics on systematic
risk. For example, advertising is undoubtedly correlated with firm size. Big firms are likely
to spend a larger amount on advertising. By using the ratio of advertising spending to sales,
we may be able to purge such firm fixed effects.
3.5.1 Bivariate Analysis
We perform bivariate analysis and report the pairwise correlation between advertising and
firm risk in both time periods in this subsection. Firm risk may be related to various firm
characteristics. For example, large firms may be regarded less risky than their smaller coun-
terparts; volatile earnings may be associated with great uncertainty; high leverage may in-
crease the probability of the firm going bust, particularly during the recession, and therefore
may be positively related to firm risk.
Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) find that firm risk is positively related to growth,
leverage, and earnings variability, while negatively related to liquidity, asset size, and the
dividend payout ratio. We therefore include the above accounting variables as control vari-
ables in the analysis. The detailed definition of the variables is as follows: growth is the log
change of total asset in year t; leverage is the ratio of total senior securities to total assets;
liquidity is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; size is the log of total assets;
dividend payout is the ratio of cash dividends to income before extraordinary items adjusted
for common stock; earnings variability is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly
earnings to share price in year t.
The dividend payout ratio has a disturbing feature. If the firm distributes cash dividends
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in a year but also has negative or close to zero income in the same year, the payout ratio can
also be negative or exceptionally large. To address this issue, we define the payout ratio to
be 100% if the ratio is either negative or larger than 1. We obtain similar results if we relax
this restriction by defining only negative payout ratio to be 100%. In addition, we control for
firm age in the regressions, which is also associated with firm risk ( see, for example, Pástor
and Veronesi (2003) and Jacquier, Titman, and Yalcin (2010)).
Table 3.5 contains the correlation matrices of the one-year lagged ratio of advertising
expenditure to sales, accounting risk measures, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. The
signs of the coefficients are interesting. First, it seems that idiosyncratic risk and systematic
risk is positively but not closely related. Second, the correlations between the variable of
interest, the one-year lagged ratio of advertising expense to sales, and systematic risk are
negative in both time periods. Although both coefficients are significant at the 5% level, the
magnitude of the coefficient during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis is significantly larger.
Third, in normal times, the correlation between advertising and idiosyncratic risk is positive
and significant at the 5% level in both cases (0.0611 and 0.0601). However, the correlations
become insignificant during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis (0.0019 and -0.0003).
Table 3.5 also shows that firm size and age are closely related to both systematic and
idiosyncratic risk. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that larger firms tend to have lower
idiosyncratic risk, but higher systematic risk. Mature firms tend to exhibit both lower sys-
tematic and idiosyncratic risk.
Moreover, Table 3.5 shows that earnings variability is more related to idiosyncratic risk,
compared to systematic risk. However, during the stock market crisis, there is a significant
rise in the magnitude of both correlations, particularly in the former. In general, the evidence
provided in Table 3.5 shows that our multivariate analysis results are unlikely to be driven
by multicollinearity.
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3.5.2 Regression Analysis
In this sub-section, we analyze the relationship between advertising and systematic risk as
well as idiosyncratic risk in a regression framework in which we also control for a variety of
accounting risk measures as well as include an industry fixed-effect specification to rule out
potential confounding effects.
Following Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970), we use the dividend payout ratio, growth
(the log change in total assets), leverage, earnings variability, liquidity, and firm size as our
control variables. The relations of firm risk with earnings variability and firm age are rather
easy to predict. Earnings variability is an explicit measure of the volatility in the firm’s cash
flows and hence should be positively related to firm risk. Firm age is also an important
measure of risk in that younger firms (especially those startups) are generally more risky
than mature firms because the former usually generate a great deal more volatile cash flows.
However, the relations between firm risk and other firm characteristics are rather unclear.
For example, dividend payout is likely to reduce the cash flows available to the firm, and
therefore potentially affects its ability to fund future profitable projects, and as a result,
its future earnings. For this reason, dividend payout may be positively related with firm
risk. On the other hand, the dividend payout ratio is regarded as a proxy of the manager’s
perception of the firm’s future prospect. Firms with lower dividend payout ratios may be
thought to have greater uncertainty as the managers choose to retain rather than distribute
the cash flows for “insurance”. In fact, firms prefer to keep a stable level of dividend payout.
Once a dividend payout ratio has been established, they are reluctant to make adjustments
in order to show the management’s confidence in the firm. From this perspective, a higher
dividend payout ratio is likely to be related with lower firm risk.
High growth (the log change of total assets) may indicate that the firm has a great deal
of investment opportunities. It may have consecutively earned excessive returns on its assets
and are able to invest in new businesses, which implies that growth may be negatively related
to firm risk. However, the firm may take projects in a new business line which is associated
72
with great risk and therefore affects its future earnings. For example, startups are likely
to exhibit entirely unpredictable cash flows, especially in the first few years. Further, the
firm may have to retain less earnings or even turn to external financing in order to finance
the expansion, which may increase the risk of insolvency provided the projects turn out
unprofitable. If investors are concerned with such risk, the relationship between growth and
firm risk should be positive. Overall, it would be very difficult to predict the relationship
between growth and firm risk.
3.5.2.1 Advertising and Systematic Risk
Product market consideration is undoubtedly the main drive for advertising. However, ad-
vertising may also have important effects on the capital market. For example, attentioned-
constrained investors may be attracted by firms that advertise intensively. Intuitively, indi-
vidual investors are more likely to suffer from limited attention since they are less resourceful
in processing information, and therefore are more likely to be influenced by advertising as
they are exposed to various types of advertising everyday, for example, when watching TV,
listening to the radio, or browsing the internet.
Professional investors certainly have more resources in processing information. However,
they are not immune to limited attention and perhaps face a less severe attention constraint.
Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) provide compelling evidence that mutual fund managers are
also influenced by mass media coverage and may prefer attention-grabbing stocks. Specifi-
cally, they find that professional fund managers are more likely to buy high-coverage stocks,
but their selling behavior is less likely to be influenced by media coverage. These fund man-
agers trade stocks with high coverage for the same reason as individual investors do. That
is, these professional investors are also vulnerable to limited attention and may be attracted
by stocks that appear frequently in the media.13 Therefore, advertising may also influence
13Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014) confirm that mutual fund managers’ preference of high-coverage stocks
is not driven by the desire to cater fund flows or by the information in the media. In other words, it is more
likely to be a result of their own attention constraint. They also find that this action in fact hampers the
fund’s future performance.
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professional investors by attracting their attention.
We argue that advertising may benefit the firm not only in the product market but also
in the financial market. On one hand, advertising may create valuable intangible assets by
promoting the firm’s products and establishing brand equity. It may increase the firm’s
market share as well as its customer loyalty, which may act as a barrier to competition.
These market-based intangible assets may also have an impact on investors and protect the
firm from stock market fluctuations, perhaps particularly during the market crisis. Indeed,
the so-called brand stocks have been on many investors’ radar for a long time. For example,
the legendary investor Warren Buffett is an advocate of these stocks. He urges that investors
should buy businesses that they are familiar with, which are usually associated with intensive
advertising such as popular consumer stocks. Of course, not all consumer stocks perform well
in comparison with the overall market. But these firms as a group have had an impressive
long-term track record. For example, the S&P 500 Consumer Staples which consists of
many firms who spend a great amount on advertising, consistently outperforms the S&P
500. These stocks also performed better during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. The S&P
500 Consumer Staples dropped by about 30% from the peak while the S&P 500 fell by about
42%. Therefore, it is not uprising that firms with intensive advertising have lower systematic
risk, especially during stock market downturns.
On the other hand, even if advertising does not provide such intangible assets that po-
tentially insulate the firm from stock market fluctuations, it may still have an impact on the
firm’s systematic risk from an information perspective. Specifically, investors attracted by
advertising may carry out further research about the firm, if they believe that it is a good
investment opportunity. By doing so, they perhaps better understand the firm’s business
as well as its future prospect. In other words, investors may take into account firm-specific
information and correctly evaluate the stock when making trades. Thus, the firm stock may
be protected from market downturns.
However, one might argue that individual investors are less likely to be able to correctly
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evaluate the firm. Indeed, these investors are less likely to collect costly private information
about the firm. The gap between the benefit and the cost of this action is perhaps wide
enough to prevent them from doing so. They may also be less skillful in evaluating the firm’s
fundamentals and its financial performance. Nevertheless, advertising may signal the quality
of the firm’s product and service, as argued by Nelson (1974), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984),
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and this signalling role perhaps also has a spillover effect
in the financial market since the firm may also use advertising to signal its private informa-
tion to investors. In a recent study, Chemmanur and Yan (2009) find that product market
advertising may signal the firm’s type and lead to less underpricing in new equity issues.
Therefore, advertising attracts investors perhaps not only because of their limited attention,
but also because it may signal the firm’s type in that firms with good prospects and growth
opportunities are more likely to spend large amounts on advertising to establish advantages
in the product market and reduce competition. If investors, particularly individuals, hold
the belief that advertising signals the firm’s private information, they may regard firms with
intensive advertising as the good type. Thus, these firms may be less affected by market
downturns. Moreover, when making trading decisions, professional investors depend on such
fundamental information and may vigorously collect private information about advertising
firms, provided they are attracted to these firms. By understanding the firm’s business,
institutional investors are more likely to acquire the intrinsic value for the firm. Hence, in
aggregate, the firm’s share may fluctuate less in response to market-wide events. Overall,
the spillover effects of product market advertising in the capital market may protect the firm
from market fluctuations.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results relating advertising and systematic risk. As dis-
cussed above, both advertising and systematic risk may be driven by industry effects. Thus,
we adopt an industry fixed-effect specification throughout the analysis. The first two columns
explore the relationship between the two variables in normal times (i.e., 2003-2012 excluding
2008-2009). Interestingly, the coefficient on the variable of interest, LAD/SALES (the lagged
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ratio of advertising expense to sales) is negative but insignificant (t=-1.11 and -1.30 in col-
umn 1 and 2, respectively). However, we note that advertising firms on average have lower
systematic risk than non-advertising firms. The signs of other coefficients are also worth
noting. For example, growth in total assets seems to be positively related to systematic risk,
which implies that growth firms are more likely to be correlated with the market. Surpris-
ingly, the coefficient on LEV is insignificant. Perhaps leverage does not play an important
role in determining systematic risk in this time period. Further, firm age is negatively related
to systematic risk, as expected. Indeed, mature firms are more likely to generate stable cash
flows and therefore are less risky than young firms.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.6 examine the relationship between advertising and systematic
risk during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. The results are largely consistent with those
in column 1 and 2 in terms of the signs of the coefficients. Note that the coefficient on
LAD/SALES remains negative but also becomes significant (t=-2.76 and -2.65 in column 3
and 4, respectively). It seems that the effect of advertising on investors is stronger during
the crisis. The sign of the coefficient on GROWTH is also negative, implying that growth
firms are less likely to be correlated with the overall market movements during the crisis.
Further, the relationship between leverage and systematic risk is positive (t=3.18 and 2.47
in column 3 and 4, respectively). Intuitively, the financial crisis may increase the probability
of bankruptcy for highly leveraged firms compared to less leveraged ones. Their earnings
may deteriorate during the crisis and therefore these firms may have more volatile cash flows,
which is likely to affect their abilities to repay outstanding debts. Thus, leverage may be
positively associated with risk during the stock market crisis.
The behaviors of both investors and firms may have changed during the crisis. Investors
may become more conservative when making trading decisions and firms may also be less
willing to take risky projects. The change in investor sentiment may have an impact on
investors assessment of firm risk. For example, Brown and Cliff (2005) find that investor
sentiment shifts during market crashes and has an impact on asset valuation. Therefore, we
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also perform a set of regressions with interaction effects in order to more accurately examine
the effect of the 2008-2009 stock market crisis on the relationship between advertising and
firm risk. Specifically, we run the following regression:
Betai,t = α0 + α1 × CRISIS × AD/SALESi,t−1 + α2 × CRISIS + α3 × AD/SALESi,t−1
+γ1 × Controls+ γ2 × CRISIS × Controls+ i,t, (3.2)
where CRISIS is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the observation is in years
2008-2009, and 0 otherwise. We also interact all control variables with CRISIS. The results
are reported in column 5 and 6 in Table 3.6.
The coefficient on the indicator variable CRISIS is negative (t=-3.73 and -1.71 in column
5 and 6, respectively), which confirms the previous analysis that shows firms on average
had lower systematic risk during the crisis. This result seems rather difficult to interpret.
However, note that on the other hand, average idiosyncratic volatility increased during the
crisis. The signs of the coefficients on control variables remain the same as in column 1 and 2.
Finally, the coefficient on the interaction between advertising and CRISIS is negative (t=-
1.38 and -1.23 in column 5 and 6, respectively), implying a stronger impact of advertising on
systematic during the crisis. The coefficient on the interaction term CRISIS×GROWTH is
negative (t=-3.18 and -3.50 in column 5 and 6, respectively), and the coefficient on CRISIS×
LEV is positive (t=2.87 and 2.60 in column 5 and 6, respectively), indicating that the stock
market crisis may have an important effect on investor sentiment.
3.5.2.2 Advertising and Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section, we explore the relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic volatility.
As mentioned above, individual investors undoubtedly are more prone to attention constraints
and therefore are more likely to be influenced by advertising. However, they may be less likely
to collect, let alone trade on value-relevant private information. The cost of collecting such
information might be relatively too high for them. But note that institutional investors may
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also be attracted by advertising, either due to their own limited attention or the signalling
role of advertising (perhaps the combination of both). Unlike individuals who might engage
in naive learning and trade on value-irrelevant information, professional investors are more
sophisticated and may carry out rigorous research before making any trading decisions. They
are more likely to collect costly unique information perhaps because they prefer to understand
the firm’s fundamentals before buying its stocks. Thus, in aggregate, the share price may be
informative about the firm’s financial position.
Roll (1988) investigates the role of undiversifiable factors in the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). He argues that with hindsight,
most financial economists believe that changes in the firm’s share price can be explained
by authenticated information. Specifically, the price movements can be attributed to the
following factors: changes in the overall economy, industry information that impacts the
firm’s performance in the product market, and lastly, firm-specific events that only affect the
firm itself. One should be able to accurately explain the stock price changes after taking
into account ex post these factors. Put differently, one should obtain a close to 1 R2 from
multiple-factor regressions. However, he finds that only a fraction (less than 40%) of the
monthly return volatility can be explained by the factors. Clearly, his result indicates the
existence of private information and that investors may trade on this unique information.
Thus, idiosyncratic volatility perhaps can be a proxy of firm-specific information which is
costly but also value relevant.
A number of studies have offered empirical evidence supporting Roll (1988)’s assertion.
For example, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find that higher levels of firm-specific volatil-
ity imply more information reflected in the share price and that more informative stock prices
perhaps facilitate more efficient corporate investment. Ferreira and Laux (2007) explore the
relationship between corporate governance and firm-specific risk and find that antitakeover
provisions are negatively associated with idiosyncratic risk. They argue that this negative
relationship is perhaps a result of institutional investors being interested in firms with fewer
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antitakeover provisions and therefore collecting unique information about these firms. They
also find that the efficiency of corporate investment is related to idiosyncratic risk, perhaps
because share prices are more informative in that fewer antitakeover provisions encourage
collection and trading on private information.
In a similar vein, if advertising attracts institutional investors, it may also encourage
them to collect unique information about the firm. Professional investors are perhaps aware
of the severe attention constraint facing individuals and that they are likely to be attracted
by attention-grabbing stocks (e.g., stocks in the media, stocks with abnormal past returns,
and stocks with high advertising expense). Therefore, they may want to collect and trade
on costly private information. By doing so, the share price may be closer to the firm’s
fundamentals and more informative, and the level of idiosyncratic volatility may be higher.
Nevertheless, during the stock market crisis, professional investors may have to rush to sell for
liquidity reasons (i.e., flight to liquidity) and their selling behavior is least affected by limited
attention.14 Moreover, the cost of collecting private information may be relatively higher
and the cost-benefit trade-off of this action may worsen in this time period. In summary,
institutional investors may be less likely to collect costly private information about advertising
firms. Thus, the relationship between advertising and idiosyncratic volatility might be weaker
during the market crisis.
Table 3.7 displays the regression results relating idiosyncratic risk and advertising. In the
first two columns we examine the relationship between the two variables in normal times.
We find that after controlling for other firm characteristics, firms with higher advertising
expenditure display higher idiosyncratic. The coefficient on LAD/SALES is 0.182 (t=4.34)
and 0.172 (t=4.20) in column 1 and 2, respectively, confirming the prediction that advertising
may encourage institutional investors to collect and trade on private information about the
firm. Column 3 and 4 present the regression results relating advertising and idiosyncratic
14See, for example, Fang, Peress, and Zheng (2014). Actually, the selling behavior of individual investors
is also less affected by limited attention because they need to sell what they already have and their portfolios
usually consist of only a few stocks, compared to choosing from thousands of stocks available in the market
when buying.
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volatility during the stock market crisis. To our surprise, the coefficient on LAD/SALES
is negative and significant (t=-1.80 and -2.25 in column 3 and 4, respectively) as we would
expect an insignificant one. Perhaps investors in general believe that advertising firms may
be less risky since financially healthy firms are more likely to invest intensively in advertising
in that the return from advertising for these firms may be relatively higher.
In column 5 and 6 we perform idiosyncratic volatility regressions with interaction effects.
The regression equation is as follows:
IdV oli,t = α0 + α1 × CRISIS × AD/SALESi,t−1 + α2 × CRISIS + α3 × AD/SALESi,t−1
+γ1 × Controls+ γ2 × CRISIS × Controls+ i,t, (3.3)
where CRISIS is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the observation is in years 2008-
2009, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction between advertising and CRISIS is
negative (t=-3.29 and -3.57 in columns 5 and 6, respectively), implying a weaker relationship
between advertising and idiosyncratic risk during the crisis since these two variables are
positively correlated in normal times. The coefficients on control variables remain the same
across the table in terms of signs, except for LIQ, the coefficient on which is insignificant.
Interestingly, size is negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. On one hand, larger firms are
less risky perhaps because they are more capable to diversify their investments. Indeed,
large firms are more likely to operate in multiple industries and markets. On the other hand,
professional may be less likely to collect private information about these firms, compared to
smaller firms whose share prices may be more likely to deviate from fundamentals.
Note that the coefficient on the indicator variable CRISIS is positive (t=4.09 and 4.19 in
column 5 and 6, respectively). In fact, the average idiosyncratic risk increased significantly for
both advertising and non-advertising firms during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. Indeed,
during this period of time, firm uncertainty grows significantly. Firms are more likely to have
volatile cash flows and even become bankrupt. The increase in idiosyncratic risk might be
investors’ rational response to the changes in the aggregate economy as well as the increased
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firm-specific uncertainty.
3.6 Robustness
Our analysis so far has been focused on firms that have non-missing advertising expenditure
data and price data on all trading days in each year. To ensure that our results are not
specific to our method in estimating firm risk, we relax the restriction and require that firms
to have at least 200 daily returns available in a given year. This process increases the number
of firm-year observations to 10,749 over the period 2003-2012. Table 3.3 and 3.4 report the
summary of systematic and idiosyncratic risk, respectively.
We replicate the analysis in Section 5. Table 3.8 investigates the relationship between
advertising and systematic risk and Table 3.9 presents the regression results relating adver-
tising and idiosyncratic risk. Consistent with previous results, we find that advertising is
negatively related to systematic risk during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis; in normal
times, the coefficient on advertising is negative but insignificant. Further, Table 3.9 shows
that advertising is positively related to idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but the two vari-
ables are negatively correlated during the crisis. The coefficients on control variables remain
similar in both Table 3.8 and 3.9. Finally, the negative coefficients on the interaction term
CRISIS × LAD/SALES in both tables imply that the stock market crisis may have an
impact on the relationship between advertising and firm risk. Overall, the results from this
robustness check show that our analysis is not specific to the approach in estimating firm
risk.
As mentioned above, firms that do not report advertising expense tend to have higher
systematic risk but lower idiosyncratic risk. In fact, Hirschey, Skiba, and Wintoki (2012)
find that these firms do not have advertising expense displayed in their income statements
and it is reasonable to assume that firms with missing advertising expense data do not
have material expense to report under this category. Thus, we perform additional regression
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analysis by treating missing values on advertising as zero, in order to more accurately explore
the relationship between advertising and firm risk. The results are very similar to those in
Section 5 in terms of the signs of the coefficients. Table 3.10 shows that advertising is also
negatively related to systematic risk in normal times. Further, the negative coefficient on the
interaction term CRISIS × LAD/SALES implies that the stock market crisis strengthens
the relationship of advertising to systematic risk. In Table 3.11, we note that the coefficient on
advertising is negative but insignificant in column 3 and 4 (t=-1.15 and -1.59, respectively),
implying that advertising is perhaps not related to idiosyncratic risk during the crisis. More
importantly, the coefficient on the interaction between advertising and CRISIS remains
negative and significant (t=-2.72 and -2.85 in column 5 and 6, respectively), confirming
that the stock market crisis have an important impact on the relationship of advertising to
idiosyncratic risk.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the effect of advertising in the capital market by investigating the
relationship between advertising and firm risk. We show that advertising is negatively related
to systematic risk, particularly during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. We also find that
advertising is positively related to idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but not during the crisis.
Further, we show that firms on average had lower systematic risk but higher idiosyncratic
risk during the crisis.
Our results support the view that advertising creates value in the capital market. The
negative relationship of advertising to systematic risk is likely a result of the market-based
intangible assets provided by advertising (e.g., brand equity, customer loyalty, and bargaining
power with suppliers) which may insulate the firm from market downturns.
This paper also lends support to the literature on limited attention. Individual investors
are likely to face a formidable search problem in the stock market and therefore are attracted
82
by advertising. Professional investors undoubtedly are resourceful. But they may also have
limited attention. Therefore, they might also be influenced by advertising. Investors, es-
pecially institutional investors, who are attracted by advertising, may collect and trade on
private information about the firm. This action may provide investors more accurate as-
sessment of the firm’s current financial performance and future prospect. Thus, firms with
intensive advertising may have higher idiosyncratic in that their share prices may be more
informative by impounding this unique information.
Due to data limitation, we do not separate product marketing from corporate advertising
in our analysis. Different advertising activities clearly have distinctive impacts on investors.
For example, advertisements that introduce new products may not convey the same type of
information as in advertisements emphasizing on firm images. Further research that uses
disaggregated measures for firms’ advertising activities may generate valuable insight into
the mechanisms by which advertising impacts the capital markets.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics for both advertising and non-advertising firms. Data on advertis-
ing expense (item#45), total assets (item#6), current liabilities (item#5), total liabilities (item#181), net
income (item#18), and sales (item#12) are collected from the Compustat annual database. The sample is
then merged with the CRSP daily file to obtain firm age and market capitalization. Firm age is the number
of years since the firm has been listed on the CRSP database. Panel A reports the summary statistics for
advertising and non-advertising firms in normal times (i.e., 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009). Panel B reports
the summary statistics for both types of firms during the stock market crisis (i.e., 2008-2009).
Panel A: Ad Expenditure (2003-2012 excluding 2008 and 2009)
Firms with Ad Exp Firms without Ad Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev
Current Assets (Million $) 1,334 201 4,787 1,023 212 3,280
Total Assets (Million $) 3,918 440 15,942 3,392 509 11,393
Current Liabilities (Million $) 913 90 3,679 703.1 91 2,547
Total Liability (Million $) 2,251 179 9,311 2,067 221 6,684
Net Income (Million $) 261 15.33 1,375 178 16 1,154
Sales (Million $) 3,668 453 15,824 2,901 440 12,593
Firm Age 18.15 13 16.23 20.45 15 17.16
Market Cap (Million $) 5,246 550 21,567 3,324 569 13,478
Ad Expenditure (Million $) 96 5 399
Ad/Sales 0.029 0.012 0.053
Ad/Assets 0.032 0.012 0.059
No obs 8,714 12,283
Panel B: Ad Expenditure (2008-2009)
Firms with Ad Exp Firms without Ad Exp
Current Assets (Million $) 1,449 233 4,767 1,212 266 3,504
Total Assets (Million $) 4,385 557 17,520 4,072 679 11,861
Current Liabilities (Million $) 1,016 108 3,990 839 121 2,718
Total Liability (Million $) 2,611 230 10,637 2,507 321 7,089
Net Income (Million $) 198 11 1,469 167 14 1,279
Sales (Million $) 4,192 562 17,884 3,558 603 14,304
Firm Age 18.80 14 16.56 21.65 16 18.10
Market Cap (Million $) 4,546 475 18,533 3,256 571 13,215
Ad Expenditure (Million $) 105 6 426
Ad/Sales 0.028 0.011 0.049
Ad/Assets 0.031 0.011 0.063
No obs 1,968 2,669
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Advertising Firms across 2003-2012
This table presents the distribution of advertising firms across 2003-2012. Firms that have non-missing
advertising expense data on the Compustat database and return data on the CRSP database are included in
the sample. The table reports the number of advertising firms, the number of advertising firms with zero ad
expense, the mean and median ad expenditure, and the mean and median ad/sales ratio, in each year.
Number of Number of Ad Expenditure (Million $) Ad/Sales
Year Advertising Firms Zero Exp Mean Median Mean Median
2003 1,021 9 82.8 4.8 0.033 0.014
2004 1,167 5 81.4 4.2 0.031 0.014
2005 1,162 5 82.6 4.6 0.030 0.013
2006 1,164 5 89.0 4.5 0.031 0.012
2007 1,133 3 98.6 5.0 0.030 0.012
2008 986 1 110.0 6.4 0.028 0.011
2009 982 5 100.5 5.6 0.028 0.010
2010 1,067 5 103.2 5.4 0.027 0.010
2011 1,020 3 114.2 6.1 0.026 0.011
2012 980 3 123.8 7.2 0.026 0.010
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Systematic Risk
This table reports the summary statistics for systematic risk obtained from the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) for both advertising and non-advertising firms. In Panel A and B, firms are required to have return
data on all T trading days in each year. In Panel C and D, firms are required to have return data on at least
200 trading days in each year. Panel A and C present the summary statistics for systematic risk in normal
times (i.e., 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009). Panel B and D present the summary statistics for systematic
risk during the stock market crisis (i.e., 2008-2009).
Firms with Ad Exp Firms without Ad Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Stdev Min Max Mean Stdev Min Max
Panel A: Systematic Risk (2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations All Trading Days in a Given Year
Systematic Risk-Equal Weighted 1.206 0.636 -0.958 4.625 1.265 0.680 -1.171 4.537
Systematic Risk-Valued Weighted 1.057 0.571 -0.822 3.700 1.101 0.611 -1.204 4.136
No obs 8,714 12,283
Panel B: Systematic Risk (2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations All Trading Days in a Given Year
Systematic Risk-Equal Weighted 1.084 0.514 -0.280 3.019 1.138 0.550 -1.426 3.429
Systematic Risk-Valued Weighted 0.992 0.491 -0.330 3.072 1.046 0.524 -1.625 3.223
No obs 1,968 2,669
Panel C: Systematic Risk (2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations 200 in a Given Year
Systematic Risk-Equal Weighted 1.201 0.641 -0.958 4.625 1.257 0.686 -3.046 4.537
Systematic Risk-Valued Weighted 1.050 0.575 -1.169 3.700 1.090 0.618 -3.697 4.136
No obs 8,949 12,705
Panel D: Systematic Risk (2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations 200 in a Given Year
Systematic Risk-Equal Weighted 1.083 0.530 -0.449 3.166 1.147 0.572 -1.426 3.620
Systematic Risk-Valued Weighted 0.987 0.507 -0.449 3.072 1.052 0.545 -1.625 3.243
No obs 2,090 2,820
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Idiosyncratic Risk
This table reports the summary statistics for idiosyncratic risk for both advertising and non-advertising firms.
In Panel A and B, firms are required to have return data on all T trading days in each year. In Panel C and
D, firms are required to have return data on at least 200 trading days in each year. Panel A and C present
the summary statistics for idiosyncratic risk in normal times (i.e., 2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009). Panel B
and D present the summary statistics for idiosyncratic risk during the stock market crisis (i.e., 2008-2009).
Firms with Ad Exp Firms without Ad Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Stdev Min Max Mean Stdev Min Max
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk (2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations All Trading Days in a Given Year
Idiosyncratic Risk-Equal Weighted -3.788 0.441 -5.370 -1.598 -3.819 0.486 -5.306 -1.538
Idiosyncratic Risk-Valued Weighted -3.786 0.448 -5.368 -1.598 -3.816 0.494 -5.308 -1.538
No obs 8,714 12,283
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk (2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations All Trading Days in a Given Year
Idiosyncratic Risk-Equal Weighted -3.417 0.392 -4.663 -1.552 -3.465 0.429 -6.025 -1.972
Idiosyncratic Risk-Valued Weighted -3.413 0.403 -4.702 -1.549 -3.464 0.440 -6.027 -1.973
No obs 1,968 2,669
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk (2003-2012 excluding 2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations 200 in a Given Year
Idiosyncratic Risk-Equal Weighted -3.773 0.452 -5.370 -1.503 -3.800 0.498 -5.306 -0.890
Idiosyncratic Risk-Valued Weighted -3.771 0.459 -5.368 -1.502 -3.797 0.506 -5.308 -0.889
No obs 8,949 12,705
Panel D: Idiosyncratic Risk (2008-2009)
Minimum No of Return Observations 200 in a Given Year
Idiosyncratic Risk-Equal Weighted -3.384 0.412 -4.663 -1.388 -3.429 0.450 -6.025 -1.735
Idiosyncratic Risk-Valued Weighted -3.380 0.422 -4.702 -1.387 -3.428 0.461 -6.027 -1.734
No obs 2,090 2,820
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Table 3.6: Advertising and Systematic Risk
This table presents the results of the multivariate analysis relating systematic risk, advertising, and a host
of accounting risk measures over different periods. All models use an industry fixed-effect specification. The
dependent variable is systematic risk (beta) estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using
equal- and value- weighted market returns, separately. Firms are required to have return data for all trading
days in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout) is the ratio of cash dividends to income before extraordinary
items adjusted for common stock; GROWTH is the log change of total asset; LEV is the ratio of total senior
securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings variability) is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly
earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; SIZE is the log of total assets.
AGE is the number of years since the firm has been listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an indicator variable
whose value is 1 if observations are in years 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are
presented in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.206 -0.164
(0.150) (0.134)
CRISIS -0.259*** -0.110*
(0.070) (0.065)
LAD/SALES -0.105 -0.105 -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.111 -0.108
(0.095) (0.081) (0.131) (0.131) (0.097) (0.082)
DIVP -0.205*** -0.158*** -0.069** -0.069** -0.215*** -0.166***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.035) (0.035) (0.023) (0.020)
GROWTH 0.070** 0.065*** -0.115** -0.115** 0.070** 0.065***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.047) (0.047) (0.028) (0.024)
LEV 0.005 -0.016 0.134*** 0.134*** -0.003 -0.023
(0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)
EVAR 0.122 0.079* 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.118 0.077*
(0.074) (0.044) (0.134) (0.134) (0.073) (0.043)
LIQ 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.004 0.004 0.019*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
SIZE 0.095*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.094*** 0.105***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
AGE -0.149*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.151*** -0.118***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,451 8,451 1,953 1,953 10,404 10,404
R2 0.138 0.153 0.201 0.201 0.147 0.158
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Table 3.7: Advertising and Idiosyncratic Risk
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis relating idiosyncratic risk, advertising, and a host
of risk measures over different periods. All models use an industry fixed-effect specification. The dependent
variable is idiosyncratic volatility (the natural log of the standard deviation of the residuals, i,t) estimated by
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using equal- and value- weighted market returns, separately. Firms
are required to have return data for all trading days in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout) is the ratio
of cash dividends to income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock; GROWTH is the log
change of total asset; LEV is the ratio of total senior securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings variability)
is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities; SIZE is the log of total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm has been
listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an indicator variable whose value is 1 if observations are in years 2008 and
2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. *,
**, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.272*** -0.286***
(0.083) (0.080)
CRISIS 0.182*** 0.189***
(0.045) (0.045)
LAD/SALES 0.182*** 0.172*** -0.117* -0.144** 0.181*** 0.171***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.065) (0.064) (0.042) (0.041)
DIVP -0.249*** -0.253*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.253*** -0.257***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.02) (0.02) (0.014) (0.014)
GROWTH 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013)
LEV 0.196*** 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.204*** 0.192*** 0.194***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.046) (0.047) (0.025) (0.025)
EVAR 0.383* 0.387* 1.178*** 1.209*** 0.382* 0.386*
(0.218) (0.221) (0.120) (0.124) (0.217) (0.220)
LIQ 0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.117*** -0.122*** -0.135*** -0.138***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.066*** -0.070***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,451 8,451 1,953 1,953 10,404 10,404
R2 0.513 0.523 0.470 0.482 0.555 0.562
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Table 3.8: Advertising and Systematic Risk - Robustness Checks
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis relating systematic risk, advertising, and a number
of accounting risk measures over different periods. All models use an industry fixed-effect specification. The
dependent variable is systematic risk (beta) estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using
equal- and value- weighted market returns, separately. Firms are required to have return data for at least
200 trading days in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout) is the ratio of cash dividends to income before
extraordinary items adjusted for common stock; GROWTH is the log change of total asset; LEV is the ratio
of total senior securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings variability) is the standard deviation of the ratios
of quarterly earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; SIZE is the log
of total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm has been listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an
indicator variable which takes value 1 if observations are in years 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust
standard errors are presented in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denotes statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.169 -0.136
(0.144) (0.129)
CRISIS -0.291*** -0.148**
(0.068) (0.063)
LAD/SALES -0.128 -0.121 -0.350*** -0.294*** -0.132 -0.122
(0.089) (0.076) (0.128) (0.112) (0.090) (0.076)
DIVP -0.200*** -0.153*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.212*** -0.163***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.035) (0.033) (0.023) (0.020)
GROWTH 0.091*** 0.077*** -0.149*** -0.137*** 0.091*** 0.077***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.043) (0.041) (0.031) (0.027)
LEV 0.012 -0.011 0.164*** 0.121*** 0.004 -0.018
(0.035) (0.034) (0.044) (0.040) (0.036) (0.034)
EVAR 0.137* 0.089* 0.503*** 0.324*** 0.133* 0.086*
(0.081) (0.048) (0.125) (0.117) (0.079) (0.046)
LIQ 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.005 0.008* 0.020*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
SIZE 0.098*** 0.109*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.108***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
AGE -0.145*** -0.113*** -0.103*** -0.091*** -0.147*** -0.115***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,679 8,679 2,070 2,070 10,749 10,749
R2 0.141 0.158 0.198 0.199 0.149 0.161
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Table 3.9: Advertising and Idiosyncratic Risk - Robustness Checks
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis relating idiosyncratic risk, advertising, and a host
of risk measures over different periods. All models use an industry fixed-effect specification. The dependent
variable is idiosyncratic risk (the natural log of the standard deviation of the residuals, i,t) estimated by
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using equal- and value- weighted market returns, separately. Firms
are required to have return data for at least 200 trading days in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout)
is the ratio of cash dividends to income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock; GROWTH
is the log change of total asset; LEV is the ratio of total senior securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings
variability) is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of
current assets to current liabilities; SIZE is the log of total assets. AGE is the number of years since the
firm has been listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an indicator variable whose value is 1 if observations are in
years 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis below coefficient
estimates. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.287*** -0.300***
(0.089) (0.086)
CRISIS 0.220*** 0.226***
(0.045) (0.046)
LAD/SALES 0.205*** 0.195*** -0.115* -0.140** 0.203*** 0.193***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.067) (0.066) (0.046) (0.045)
DIVP -0.258*** -0.262*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.263*** -0.267***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014)
GROWTH 0.013 0.015 -0.014 -0.015 0.014 0.016
(0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.029) (0.014) (0.014)
LEV 0.211*** 0.213*** 0.208*** 0.219*** 0.206*** 0.208***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.047) (0.048) (0.025) (0.025)
EVAR 0.406* 0.410* 1.110*** 1.135*** 0.405* 0.409*
(0.228) (0.230) (0.102) (0.105) (0.227) (0.229)
LIQ 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE -0.138*** -0.141*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.138*** -0.142***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.063*** -0.066***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,679 8,679 2,070 2,070 10,749 10,749
R2 0.521 0.530 0.486 0.497 0.564 0.571
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Table 3.10: Advertising and Systematic Risk - Additional Robustness Checks
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis relating systematic risk, advertising, and a number
of accounting risk measures over different periods. Miss values on advertising expense are replaced with 0. All
models use an industry fixed-effect specification. The dependent variable is systematic risk (beta) estimated
by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using equal- and value- weighted market returns, separately.
Firms are required to have return data for all trading days in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout) is the
ratio of cash dividends to income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock; GROWTH is the log
change of total asset; LEV is the ratio of total senior securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings variability)
is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities; SIZE is the log of total assets. AGE is the number of years since the firm has been
listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if observations are in years 2008
and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis below coefficient estimates.
*, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.157 -0.162
(0.171) (0.151)
CRISIS -0.214*** -0.043
(0.043) (0.039)
LAD/SALES -0.239** -0.178** -0.377*** -0.311** -0.233** -0.170**
(0.105) (0.0837) (0.145) (0.129) (0.105) (0.084)
DIVP -0.244*** -0.195*** -0.049** -0.037 -0.254*** -0.203***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014)
GROWTH 0.046*** 0.042*** -0.121*** -0.113*** 0.043*** 0.039***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.034) (0.032) (0.017) (0.015)
LEV -0.030 -0.049** 0.091*** 0.044 -0.038 -0.055**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023)
EVAR 0.200** 0.116** 0.503*** 0.392*** 0.193** 0.110**
(0.098) (0.056) (0.135) (0.123) (0.095) (0.054)
LIQ 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
SIZE 0.096*** 0.109*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.107***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
AGE -0.120*** -0.092*** -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.121*** -0.093***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,997 20,997 4,637 4,637 25,634 25,634
R2 0.138 0.155 0.226 0.230 0.148 0.161
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Table 3.11: Advertising and Idiosyncratic Risk - Additional Robustness Checks
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis relating idiosyncratic risk, advertising, and a host
of risk measures over different periods. Miss values on advertising expense are replaced with 0. All models
use an industry fixed-effect specification. The dependent variable is idiosyncratic risk (the natural log of the
standard deviation of the residuals, i,t) estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), using equal-
and value- weighted market returns, separately. Firms are required to have return data for all trading days
in a given year. DIVP (dividend payout) is the ratio of cash dividends to income before extraordinary items
adjusted for common stock; GROWTH is the log change of total asset; LEV is the ratio of total senior
securities to total assets; EVAR (earnings variability) is the standard deviation of the ratios of quarterly
earnings to share price; LIQ is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; SIZE is the log of total assets.
AGE is the number of years since the firm has been listed on the CRSP file. Crisis is an indicator variable
whose value is 1 if observations are in years 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are
presented in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Normal Times The Stock 2003-2012
Market Crisis
Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol Id-Vol
Market Returns Used EW VW EW VW EW VW
CRISIS*LAD/SALES -0.225*** -0.232***
(0.083) (0.082)
CRISIS 0.185*** 0.196***
(0.028) (0.028)
LAD/SALES 0.160*** 0.149*** -0.074 -0.099 0.159*** 0.146***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.065) (0.063) (0.039) (0.038)
DIVP -0.250*** -0.254*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.255*** -0.259***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
GROWTH 0.001 0.003 -0.011 -0.013 0.000 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
LEV 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.189*** 0.200*** 0.220*** 0.222***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
EVAR 0.602** 0.607** 0.913*** 0.933*** 0.599** 0.605**
(0.285) (0.288) (0.132) (0.137) (0.284) (0.287)
LIQ 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.122*** -0.127*** -0.141*** -0.144***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE -0.064*** -0.067*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.064*** -0.067***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls, interacted
with CRISIS Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,997 20,997 4,637 4,637 25,634 25,634
R2 0.558 0.566 0.489 0.505 0.584 0.591
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Chapter 4
Incentives and the Informativeness of
Analysts’ Forecasts
Summary
In this chapter, we turn to sell-side financial analysts, who play an important role in mod-
ern capital markets by rigorously collecting private information. Analysts produce various
forecasts and stock recommendations, along with a conceptual report describing the firm’s
prospects. Institution and retail investors use these forecasts to make investment decisions.
To provide proper incentives, brokerage houses often tie analysts’ compensation to some
measures such as trading volume or the investment business that they bring in.
We provide a simple single-period model to study the effects of trading incentives and the
reputational concern on the informativeness of analysts’ forecasts. In the model, we analyze
the analyst’s forecasting strategy in three scenarios. If the analyst has only the reputational
concern, she is likely to discard her private signal and conform to the investor’s extreme prior,
leading to a lower degree of informativeness in her forecast; If the analyst is motivated by only
the trading incentive, she has a strong incentive to report against the investor’s prior belief,
regardless of her private information. When motivated by both the reputational concern and
trading incentives, the analyst is more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic.
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4.1 Introduction
Sell-side analysts play an important role in modern capital markets. Within the United
States, most top-tier investment banks spend in excess of $100 million dollars annually on
equity research.1 Analysts produce earnings forecasts, target price forecasts and stock re-
commendations, along with a conceptual report describing the firm’s prospects. Institution
and retail investors use these forecasts to make investment decisions. To provide proper in-
centives, brokerage houses often tie analysts’ compensation to some measures such as trading
volume or investment business that they bring in. Recent regulations (for example, the 2003
Global Analyst Research Settlement) shelter analysts from the conflict of interest caused by
investment banking activities, but unexpectedly aggravate the conflict of interest caused by
trading commission.
Typically, analysts are paid a fixed percentage of the trading commissions they generate;
the greater the price movements caused by the analysts’ forecasts, the higher the trade gen-
erated for their employer. Therefore, analysts have strong incentive to move the stock price
of the firm as much as possible. However, analysts’ incentives are not limited to generating
trading commissions. They also care about their reputation, which determines their ability
to generate trade in the next period (see, for example, Jackson (2005)). Furthermore, highly
reputed analysts are more likely to be promoted. Thus, analysts must trade off short-term
trading commission gains against the long-term gains from a good reputation.
Typically, analysts are paid a fixed percentage of the trading commissions they generate;
the greater the price movements caused by the analysts’ forecasts, the higher the trade gen-
erated for their employer. Therefore, analysts have strong incentive to move the stock price
of the firm as much as possible. However, analysts’ incentives are not limited to generating
trading commissions. They also care about their reputation, which determines their ability to
generate trade in the next period (Jackson 2005). Furthermore, highly reputed analysts are
1See Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011). The Sanford C. Bernstein estimates that average annual
research budgets at the top 8 investment banks were between $200 and $300 million during the 2000-2003
period.
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more likely to be promoted, or assigned large and important firms such as Apple, Microsoft,
and IBM. In a nutshell, analysts must trade off the short-term trading commission against
the long-term gains from a good reputation.
The main purpose of this exercise is to study how these incentives influence analysts’
forecasting behavior and how informative the analysts’ forecasts are. We build a simple
one-period model with one analyst and one investor who represents the market. The analyst
is not confined to report truthfully in our model. At t = 0, the analyst receives a private
signal represented by binary values (i.e., low and high) about the firm’s earnings. The signal
is free and the analyst cannot improve the precision of the signal by exerting costly effort.
However, analysts differ in talents in that they can be either good or bad. Good analysts’
signal is more precise than that of bad ones. However, both the analyst and the investor has
no information about the type of the analyst. Instead, they both know the prior distribution
of the analyst’s type. At t = 1 the analyst releases a message to the investor. The investor
updates his belief about the earnings of the firm and trades. At t = 2, the firm publicly
reports its profit. The investor compares the realised earnings with the message he receives
from the analyst, and revises his belief about the analyst’s type.
One might argue that reputational concern is sufficient to refrain sell-side analysts from
issuing biased forecasts. However, we find reputational concern can sometimes have a perverse
effect. We show that when the analyst has only reputational concern and shares the same
prior belief about the firm’s earnings, she truthfully reports her private information only if
the prior is at the intermediate range. If the analyst receives an opposite signal (one that
contradicts the prior) while holding too extreme priors, she is likely to infer that she is the
bad type. Thus, the analyst will discard her signal and instead report the prior to pretend
to be good, which leads to a less degree of informativeness in her forecast.
We also find that when the analyst is only concerned about trading commission, she tends
to report in such a way that moves the stock price as much as possible. In a effort to achieve
so, she has a strong incentive report against the expectation of the investor. Therefore, if
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the analyst’s signal is different from the prior, her forecast is consistent with her signal.
However, when the analyst’s private signal is the same as the prior, her forecast contradicts
her signal, causing information loss. Therefore, the analyst’s forecast can only partially reveal
her private signal.
Finally, we also find that when taking both reputational concern and trading incentives
into account, analysts are more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic. The intuition is that,
the reputational loss from misreporting is larger when the analyst is pessimistic but receives
a high signal, and therefore she requires higher commission to offset the loss in reputation.
This result is consistent with a number of empirical studies that show analysts’ earnings
forecasts are on average optimistic.2
4.2 Literature
Interestingly, early researchers often argue about the respective merits of analysts’ forecasts
and time-series forecasts. For example, Barefield and Comiskey (1975) find that analysts
outperform a simple random walk forecast by examining forecasts for 100 firms. Brown and
Rozeff (1978) conclude that analysts outperform most time-series models at longer horizons.
Womack (1996) also provides empirical evidence that analysts may possess market timing and
stock picking abilities. He finds that the initial return at the time of the recommendations
is significant and the issuance of both buy and sell recommendations also has an important
impact on stock prices in the subsequent period.
In addition, empirical studies in accounting and finance often use analysts’ forecasts as
a proxy of the capital market’s earnings expectation. This collection of studies may take
2 See, for example, Kothari (2001), Morgan and Stocken (2003), Jackson (2005), Cowen, Groysberg, and
Healy (2006), and Beyer and Guttman (2011).
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the view that analysts’ forecasts are unbiased such that analysts fully reveal their private
information. However, financial analysts are also human beings and are subject to behavioral
biases. For example, they may be motivated by various incentives (e.g., trading commission,
career concern, and investment banking ties) in making earnings forecasts, and may turn out
to be biased.
Indeed, numerous literatures show that analysts are prone to all sorts of conflicts of
interest, such as investment banking activities (Dugar and Nathan (1995), Michaely and
Womack (1999), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000), and Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok
(2007)), and trading commission (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)). Sell-side analysts
also care about reputation because highly reputed analysts are more likely to enjoy promotion
(Hong and Kubik (2003)), and can have greater impact on stock price (see, for example,
Stickel (1992) and Park and Stice (2000)). Since the burst of dot-com bubble, extensive
efforts have been made by the regulators to address the conflict of interests facing sell-
side analysts. For instance, the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement demands a full
separation between the research arm of an investment bank and its investment business
department. These measures undoubtedly shelter analysts from the conflict of interest caused
by investment banking activities, but may aggravate the conflict of interest caused by other
incentives. Particularly, reputational concern and trading commission incentives may have
an important role in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Consequently, analysts are likely to face a
classic trade-off between a potential loss in long-term reputation and a sizeable gain in the
short-term monetary payoff by publishing biased research.
This exercise is related to the large volume of literature on experts’ reputation. Bernheim
(1994) analyzes a model of social interactions in which individuals are concerned about status
as well as the intrinsic utility derived directly from consumption. In his analysis, status de-
pends on public perceptions about an individual’s predispositions rather than on his or her
actions. He concludes that when status is sufficiently important relative to the intrinsic util-
ity, many individuals conform to a single homogeneous standard of behavior. Morris (2001)
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develops a dynamic cheap-talk model of communication in which the principal is initially un-
sure if the agent is biased or not. He studies one particular problem in eliciting information:
the perverse reputational incentive of a good agent. He finds that if the principal thinks that
the agent is biased in favour of one decision implemented by the principal, the agent has a
reputational incentive to lie because she does not want to be thought to be biased. If the
reputational concern is sufficiently important, her message contains no private information.
In a similar vein, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that if managers care too much about
their reputation for being smart, then they will have reputational incentives to say the ex-
pected things, leading to a lower degree of informativeness. 3 Furthermore, Prendergast and
Stole (1996) find that reputation may distort a manager’s decision making. Specifically, they
show that a young manager who maximises current profits from his investment decisions
and his end-period reputation tends to exaggerate his own information in order to appear
as a fast learner, but is likely to become too conservative to react to new information in the
future.
This exercise is also closely related to recent studies on the optimism of financial ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts. For example, Jackson (2005) studies sell-side analysts’ forecasting
strategies and provides evidence that trading commission leads to optimistic forecasts, even
when issuing biased reports has a negative impact on their reputation. Cowen, Groysberg,
and Healy (2006) show that forecast optimism is related to brokerage activities. They also
find that analysts employed by firms that fund research through investment banking activit-
ies and trading activities issue relatively pessimistic recommendations, implying that trading
incentives and underwriting incentives are supplements in determining optimism. Beyer and
Guttman (2011) investigate how the effect of trading volume biases sell-side analysts’ fore-
casts and predict that analysts are on average optimistic, and the expected squared forecast
3 There are a number of studies on the problem of eliciting information in a more general setting. For
example, see Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), Shin (1998), and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
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error increases in the precision of her private information. Hong and Kubik (2003) even argue
that analysts are routinely rewarded by brokerage houses for being optimistic as long as the
optimism is within a range of accuracy that maintains the credibility of analysts. Analysts
who are relatively more optimistic compared to their peers are much less likely to be fired by
or to leave a top brokerage house, and much more likely to be hired by another house with a
better reputation. They are also more likely to receive better assignments, such as covering
large and well-known stocks (e.g., Google, Apple, and Facebook). Overall, the propositions
in this exercise are consistent with the empirical evidence.
4.3 The Model
In this section, we develop a simple one-period model to study how reputational concern,
and trading commission incentives influence analysts’ forecasts. Although the model focuses
on these two incentives, it is important to understand the other incentives that may influ-
ence sell-side analysts in forecasting earnings. Bradshaw (2011) provides a comprehensive
summary for the source of analysts’ optimism. For example, analysts have also been accused
of being optimistic in order to maintain access to firm managers who are a primary source of
information flow (Francis and Philbrick (1993), Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998),
and Lim (2001)). Other sources for optimism includes investment banking fees, institutional
investor relationship, and research for hire.
4.3.1 Economy Settings
The model in this analysis is built upon Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) and Jackson (2005).
There are two players in the game, one analyst (she) and one investor (he). Figure 4.1 shows
timeline of events. At t = 0, the analyst is hired by the investor to make earnings forecasts.
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The realization of the firm’s earnings takes binary values, ω ∈ {ωl, ωh}The analyst receives
a private signal σ∈ {σ
l
, σ
h
}, where σl < σh. In order to simplify our analysis, we assume
that the signal is free and the analyst cannot improve the precision of the signal by exerting
costly effort. Let t ∈ {b, g} (bad or good) denote the analyst’s type. The analyst does not
have any control over the realisation of true state, but the precision of her signal depends on
her talent or type. A good analyst receives a more precise signal. However, t is not known
to either the analyst or the investor. Instead, both hold a common prior belief about the
analyst’s type, Pr(t = g) = p ∈ (0, 1). Put differently, p is the analyst’s prior reputation.
Let ρ = Pr(σ = ω) denote the precision of the analyst’s private signal. Thus, with
probability ρ, the analyst receives a correct signal; with probability 1 − ρ, she receives a
wrong signal. Intuitively, 1 > ρg > ρb = 0.5. The probability that a good analyst receives
a matched signal is higher than that of a bad analyst. The assumption of ρb = 0.5 implies
that a bad analyst always receives a noisy signal that contains no value and delivers no
information on ω. Coupled with the assumption that the analyst also does not know her
type, the precision of her signal is ρ = Pr(σ = ω) = pρg + (1− p)ρb > 0.5.
 
Analyst receives 
private signal σ. 
Neither analyst nor 
investor knows 
analyst’s type.  
Analyst sends 
message m to 
investor. Investor 
updates his belief 
and places trade. 
True state realises. 
Investor compares 
earnings ω with 
message m and 
updates his belief 
about analyst’s 
type. 
   t=0     t=1    t=2 
Figure 4.1: Timeline
At t = 1, the analyst releases a message m∈ {m
l
,m
h
}to the investor. However, she does
not need to report truthfully. For example, she can report mh when she observes σl. The
investor updates his belief about the expected earnings upon the forecast. He recalculates
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the price of the firm’s stock P (m) and trades to achieve optimal holdings. The greater price
movements, the higher trading volume, the higher commission to the analyst. Therefore, the
analyst has incentive to move the stock price as much as possible.
At t = 2, the firm reports a profit from a binary set, ω∈ {ω
l
, ω
h
}. The investor’s prior
belief or the market expectation about the earnings, Pr(ω = ωh) = q is drawn from a uniform
distribution between zero and one (q ∈ (0, 1)). The prior is shared by the analyst. If q < 0.5,
the investor is pessimistic about the future; if q > 0.5, the investor is optimistic. The investor
compares the realised earnings with the message he receives from the analyst, and revises his
beliefs about the analyst’s type. Naturally, if m = ω, her reputation is favorably updated; if
m 6= ω, her reputation is negatively updated. Reputation is important to the analyst, because
highly reputed analysts are more likely to be promoted by brokerage houses, or assigned to
cover larger firms such as Apple (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011), and Hong and Kubik
(2003)). Analysts with a better reputation may also have a greater impact on future price
movements (Stickel (1992) and Park and Stice (2000)). In other words, reputation may
generate more trades in the future and higher trading commission.
Therefore, the analyst faces a trade-off between truthfully revealing her private inform-
ation that may build up her reputation for future benefits and misleading investors with
inaccurate forecasts that potentially generate higher trading commission.
In the following analysis, we first examine the case in which the analyst is only concerned
with her reputation. We then turn to the scenario where she is only motivated by trad-
ing commission. Finally, we investigate the case in which the analyst is motived by both
incentives,
4.3.2 Reputational Concern
It is well known that the reputation can perform as a useful disciplining device when the
qualities of the goods or service are hard to measure, because buyers often choose sellers
on the basis of their reputation. Therefore, sellers have incentives to build their reputation.
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In this model, the investor and the analyst correspond to and the buyer and the seller,
respectively. Reputation is the investor’s belief about the analyst’s innate ability, or talent
(i.e., Pr(t = g|m,ω).
At t = 0, the investor believes that the analyst is a talented one with probability p. At
t = 2, the investor compares the reported earnings ω with the analyst’s message m, and
updates her reputation accordingly. Intuitively, if the forecast m matches the outcome ω, the
precision of the analyst’s signal is high and the investor may upgrade the analyst’s reputation;
if the forecast deviates from the earnings reported by the firm, the precision of her signal
is low, and the investor is likely to downgrade the analyst. The aim of the analyst can be
summarized by the following objective function:
maxmE[Pr(t = g|m,ω)]. (4.1)
Since the economy is described by the binary state, there are four cases (i.e., (mh, ωh), (mh, ωl),
(ml, ωh), and (ml, ωl)). By Bayes’ rule, we can compute the posterior reputation for the ana-
lyst:
Pr(t = g|mh, ωh) = pρg
pρg + (1− p)ρb
Pr(t = g|mh, ωl) = p(1− ρg)
p(1− ρg) + (1− p)(1− ρb)
Pr(t = g|ml, ωh) = p(1− ρg)
p(1− ρg) + (1− p)(1− ρb)
Pr(t = g|ml, ωl) = pρg
pρg + (1− p)ρb .
Note that (mh, ωh) and (ml, ωl), (mh, ωl) and (ml, ωh) are symmetric cases.
Comparing the cases where m = ω and m 6= ω, we find that Pr(t = g|mh, ωl) = Pr(t =
g|ml, ωh) 6 p 6 Pr(t = g|mh, ωh) = Pr(t = g|ml, ωl). This result shows that lower forecast
accuracy has a negative impact on the analyst’s reputation, which is consistent with previous
empirical studies. For example, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) examine the link between
reputation and herding in the labor market for security analysts. They find that younger
analysts herd more than their more experienced counterparts. That is, younger analysts
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forecast closer to the consensus forecast, because they are more likely to be punished harshly
for poor forecasting performance and forecast boldness.
Intuitively, if the investor interacts with the analyst over time and therefore can observe
an increasing number of realizations of earnings, his posterior belief about the analyst’s type
is likely to converge to the truth. In other words, the investor is likely to know whether the
analyst is a good or a bad one after sufficiently many observations. That is, Pr(t = g|m,ω)
will converge either to 1 or to 0. However, the investor may fire the analyst before he acquires
sufficient observations. Technically, the investor needs to hire the analyst infinitely often to
learn her type.
Note that the analyst shares the same prior belief q as the investor about the firm’s
earnings ω at t = 0. After receiving the signal, she will update the prior belief about ω. By
Bayes’ rule, we obtain the posterior belief:
Pr(ω = ωh|σh) = ρq
ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)
Pr(ω = ωh|σl) = (1− ρ)q(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)
Pr(ω = ωl|σh) = (1− ρ)(1− q)
ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)
Pr(ω = ωl|σl) = ρ(1− q)(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q) .
What happens if the prior q is too extreme? Does the analyst fully reveal her signal?
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) argues that when the expert is uniformed about her own
ability, the separating equilibrium of the reputational signalling game is an informative one
or truth telling only if the prior belief is in the intermediate range. The expert reveals
nothing when the prior is too extreme. Consider an intuitive example provided by Ely and
Välimäki (2003). A faulty car requires either tune-ups, which helps only minor problems, or
replacement of engine, which fixes everything but costs significantly more. Put differently,
the prior belief about the necessity of engine replacement is either 0 or 1. Suppose there is no
warranty for the repair, an unreliable mechanic then will always choose to perform the more
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expensive service even when it is not needed. How should an honest mechanic distinguish
himself? He will perform tune-ups even when these are not enough to fix the car. This
example lustrates that reputational concern may have a perverse effect on the efficiency.
Intuitively, the analyst is likely to compare her signal σ to the prior belief q. Note
that both the investor and the analyst share the same q. The analyst does not want to be
perceived as the bad type, and she compares the posterior belief and reports accordingly.
Specifically, she may prefer to report mh only if Pr(ωl|σh) 6 Pr(ωh|σh), and ml only if
Pr(ωh|σl) 6 Pr(ωl|σl), which implies q > 1−ρ and q 6 ρ. Hence, a fully revealing equilibrium
only exists when q ∈ [1− ρ, ρ].
Moreover, the analyst’s report may convey no information if q is too extreme such that
q /∈ [1 − ρ, ρ]. Suppose q > ρ. An extreme value of q towards 1 implies that at t = 0 the
investor is overly optimistic and believes that a high state is much more likely to happen,
which is known to the analyst. If the analyst receives σl at t = 2, she may start to worry that
the investor may think that she has a higher likelihood to be a bad one because the prior is so
extreme that Pr(ωh|σl) > Pr(ωl|σl). Hence, in order to pretend to be good, the analyst may
prefer to go along with the prior q and issue mh, regardless of her signal σl. If the investor is
rational, he will take into account the adverse effect of reputation and ignores the report mh.
Now suppose q < 1− ρ. In this case, an extreme prior towards 0 indicates that the investor
is extremely pessimistic and believes that the outcome is more likely to be ωl. If the analyst
receives σl, she tends to be truthful by reporting ml. If she receives σh instead, she is likely to
make a low forecast ml regardless of her signal, because she expects that truthfully reporting
will lead to a downward revision to her reputation by the market. In summary, when the
prior belief about the future state is too extreme, the analyst may discard her private signal
and conform to the prior belief, leading to a lower degree of informativeness in her earnings
forecast.
Proposition 1. If the analyst is motivated by only the reputational concern, she truthfully
reveals her private information only if q ∈ [1−ρ, ρ]; she may report against her private signal
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σ and conform to the prior q if q is too extreme such that q < 1− ρ or q > ρ and her signal
is against the prior.
Indeed, Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) point out that the reputational concern to meet
buyers’ exception may lead sellers to discard useful information. Morris (2001) also develops
a dynamic model that explains a privately informed agent wishes to convey her information
to the principal with identical preferences. If the principal doubts that the agent is biased,
and the agent wishes to be thought to be unbiased, the agent may have a strong incentive
to lie in order to keep her reputation. If the reputational incentive is strong enough, no
information is contained in the communication.
The above analysis relies on the assumption that the analyst does not know her type. If
the analyst is aware of her type, then her forecast also depends on her type. Suppose that
the analyst receives a high signal and the investor has a low prior (q < 0.5). If the analyst
knows that she is good, she tends to take the risk and report truthfully (i.e., mh), since her
private signal is relatively more precise and the realisation of ω has a higher likelihood to be
high. The analyst therefore is more likely to have a reputational gain. On the other hand,
if the analyst is aware that she is bad, she may prefer to conform to the prior belief and
report ml since she cannot risk as much as the good one. Thus, a good analyst can truthfully
communicate with the investor at a higher frequency than a bad one.
4.3.3 Trading Commission Incentive
We now consider the case in which the analyst is motivated by only the trading commission
incentive. Several empirical studies examine the incentive for analysts to generate trade. For
example, Hayes (1998) models an analyst’s information production or coverage decision in
the presence of trade-generation incentives. She finds that the analyst’s incentive to collect
information are strongest for stocks that are expected to perform well, and forecasts for these
stocks are likely to be more accurate than forecasts for stocks that are expected to perform
poorly.
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The analysis in this section is built upon Jackson (2005), who shows that trading com-
mission is positively correlated to stock price movements. More specifically, the greater the
stock price change, the higher trading volume, the higher commission to the financial analyst.
Therefore, the analyst is likely to be motivated to move the stock price at t = 1 from the
price at t = 0 as much as possible. Let P0 = qωh + (1− q)ωl denote the initial stock price at
t = 0, her objective function can be summarized in a reduced form:
maxm|P1(m)− P0|. (4.2)
At t = 1, the analyst releases an earnings forecast m. Upon receiving the report, the
investor updates his prior belief about the firm’s earnings and prices the stock. Specifically,
the price corresponding to a high forecast mh is:
P1(mh) = E[ωh|mh]
= ωl[Pr(mh|σh)(1− ρ) + Pr(mh|σl)ρ](1− q) + ωh[Pr(mh|σh)ρ+ Pr(mh|σl)(1− ρ)]q
Pr(mh|σl)[(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + Pr(mh|σh)[ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] ,
where Pr(mh|σh) and Pr(mh|σl) are the analyst’s forecasting strategy. In the first case, the
analyst is truthful by revealing her private signal. She is misleading the investor by reporting
mh when she observes σl in the second scenario though. Let T denote Pr(mh|σh), and F
denote Pr(mh|σl), then the updated price following a high forecast mh can be rewritten as:
P1(mh) =
ωl[T (1− ρ) + Fρ](1− q) + ωh[Tρ+ F (1− ρ)]q
F [(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + T [ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] .
The price corresponding to a low forecast ml is as follows:
P1(ml) =
ωl[(1− T )(1− ρ) + (1− F )ρ](1− q) + ωh[(1− T )ρ+ (1− F )(1− ρ)]q
(1− F )[(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + (1− T )[ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] ,
where T = Pr(ml|σl), and F = Pr(mh|σl). Note that T and F take the same values in both
cases such that Pr(mh|σh) = Pr(ml|σl) and Pr(mh|σl) = Pr(mh|σl).
Intuitively, the investor may believe that the analyst is more likely to be truthful than
misleading, That is, she is more likely to issue a high report mh than a low forecast ml
when she receives a high signal σh, and vice versa. If the investor instead believes that
there is no credibility in the analyst’s earnings forecast such that she is always lying, he can
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always choose an opposite action upon receiving the message. Moreover, we assume that the
analyst’s message must contain some information about the firm’s future prospect, otherwise
the investor do not need to hire her in the first place. In summary, the analysis focuses on one
scenario in which the analyst is credible to some extent, implying Pr(mh|σh) > Pr(mh|σl)
and Pr(ml|σl) > Pr(ml|σh). Therefore, we have T > F . Upon this assumption, it is not
difficult to verify that the price following a low message P1(ml) is no higher than the initial
price P0, and that the price following a high message P1(mh) is no lower than P0:
P1(ml) < P0 < P1(mh).
Thus, the analyst can move the price in both directions, depending on her message. The
analyst is also rewarded a fraction of the trading fees as her commission from the brokerage
house. The larger the price movement, the higher trading volume, the higher trading com-
mission to her. For simplicity, we assume that the analyst’s commission C is the difference
between P1 and P0. Hence, the analyst has an incentive to move the stock price as much as
possible. Let C(mh) denote her trading commission following a high earnings forecast mh:
C(mh) = |P1(mh)− P0| = | (ωh − ωl)(T − F )q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)
F [(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + T [ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] |,
and C(ml) denote the commission following a low report ml:
C(ml) = |P0 − P1(ml)| = | (ωh − ωl)(T − F )q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)(1− F )[(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + (1− T )[ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] |.
Clearly, the analyst’s trading commission is a function of the investor’s prior belief q, the
precision of the analyst’s signal ρ, and her forecasting strategy. If the investor believes that
the analyst randomly issues an earnings forecast after she receives a private signal σ (i.e.,
Pr(mh|σh) = Pr(mh|σl, and Pr(ml|σl) = Pr(mh|σl), the analyst receives no commission at
all, since T = F , implying C(mh) = C(ml) = 0. Further, the assumption that the analyst’s
private information is value-relevant (ρ > 12) ensures that, ceteris paribus, she always receives
non-zero commission as 2ρ− 1 > 0.
The assumption T > F indicates that the stock price moves up following a high earnings
forecast, and drops after a low forecast. If the investor believes that the analyst is more
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likely to mislead him, then the stock price still changes but in the opposite direction at t = 1,
since T < F . The analyst still gets the trading commission from her brokerage house. For
simplicity, we focus on the case where T > F .
How does the analyst’s trading commission vary in the precision of her signal ρ and her
prior reputation p? It is easy to show that ∂C(mh)
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂C(ml)
∂ρ
> 0, if the investor believes
that the analyst is credible to some extent (T > F ). In addition, since ρ = Pr(σ = ω) =
pρg+(1−p)ρb, ρ is increasing in p. For example, if the analyst is the good type, the precision
of her signal converges to ρg; if she is a bad analyst, the precision of her signal is simply ρb.
Note that a bad analyst’s signal contains no information about the firm’s future earnings
(0.5 = ρb < ρg<1). Therefore, ∂C(mh)∂p > 0 and
∂C(ml)
∂p
> 0. In summary, the analyst’s trading
commission is increasing in both her prior reputation p and the precision of her signal ρ.4
Intuitively, the analyst’s reputation plays an important role in her ability to move the
stock price. The better reputation she has, the higher likelihood that the investor believes
her and therefore adjusts the stock price P1(m) accordingly. Indeed, a number of empirical
studies find that more reputed analysts can have a greater impact on stock prices and hence
generate higher commission to themselves (see, for example, Stickel (1992), Irvine (2004),
and Jackson (2005)).
More importantly, does the prior belief about the firm’s future earnings also play a role in
determining the analyst’s trading commission? Note that we assume that the analyst has full
knowledge about q, which she can observe from P0 = qωh + (1− q)ωl. As mentioned above,
if the analyst is only concerned with the trading commission, her objective is to move the
stock price as much as possible so that she can generate as many trades as possible. Suppose
that the investor believes that the analyst truthfully reveals her private signal (T = 1 and
F = 0), then the analyst is for sure motivated to deviate and report against the prior belief
q. Moreover, if the analyst reports a forecast that coincides with the prior, she is likely to
tell the truth. More Specifically, if the investor is pessimistic about the future (q < 0.5),
4Note that the precision of the analyst’s signal not only depends on the probability of her being the good
type, p, but also on the precision of the signal for a good analyst, ρg, since ρb = 12 .
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a low forecast ml reveals that the analyst indeed receives σl, but a high forecast mh does
not contain information about the analyst’s private signal. She may receive either σh or σl.
When the investor is optimistic (q > 0.5), a high forecast indicates that the analyst observes
σh, but a low forecast reveals nothing about her private information. Thus, the analyst does
not always fully reveal her signal in equilibrium. Her forecasting behavior can be summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the analyst is motivated by only the trading commission incentive, she
only fully reveals her private information if the investor is neutral (q=0.5). If the investor is
pessimistic (q<0.5), she reports mh for certain when she observes σh; she may report either
mh or ml when she observes σl. If the investor is optimistic (q>0.5), she reports ml for
certain if she observes σl; she may report either mh or ml when she observes σh.
Intuitively, if the investor is pessimistic about the firm’s performance (q < 0.5), a high
forecast mh can move the firm’s stock price more than ml, and therefore can generate higher
trading volume and more commission to the analyst. Thus, if the analyst observes σh, she
reports mh for certain to maximize her commission, which is in line with her private signal; if
she observes σl instead, she may either report mh or ml. The analyst cannot report against
the investor’s prior belief with probability 1 (in this case, mh). If she does, the investor
is likely to discard her earnings forecast at t = 1. Knowing this, he does not need to hire
the analyst in the first place. Overall, a low forecast indicates a high probability that the
analyst receives a low signal, and hence may contain more information than a high forecast.
Remember that in this case, ml always indicates σl, but mh does not always imply σh. In a
similar vein, if the investor is optimistic (q > 0.5), a low forecast can move the stock price
more and generate more commission. In this case, a high report conveys more information
than a low report.
When we are unsure about something, we usually seek advice from someone who is more
111
knowledgeable. For example, a student who does not know how to solve a problem is likely
to seek help from his or her teacher, instead of relying on himself or herself. When the
investor is neither optimistic nor pessimistic (q = 0.5), he is mostly uncertain about the
future and is more likely to turn to the expert. Thus, as long as the analyst’s signal contains
information about the firm value such that ρ = pρg + (1 − p)ρb > 0.5, there is likely to be
more demand for her forecast. However, the investor will trade only when he knows that
the forecast is informative or truthful. Therefore, the analyst is more likely to fully reveal
her private signal in order to earn trading commission. Put differently, the analyst’s forecast
is more informative when the investor is uncertain about the future state, since she is less
likely to deviate from her signal. The proposition is supported by several empirical studies.
For example, Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) find that the level of return uncertainty
is positively correlated with the informativeness of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically,
they argue that the informativeness of analysts’ forecasts depends on the demand for their
equity research.
4.3.4 Combined Incentives
In this section, we examine the combined effect of the trading commission incentive and the
reputational concern on the analyst.
Previous analysis shows that if the analyst is motivated by only the reputational concern,
she may conform to the investor’s prior belief in order to maintain a good reputation. Further,
if she is motivated by only the trading commission incentive, she tends to report against the
investor’s prior belief to acquire as high trading commission as possible. Therefore, it seems
that the two incentives have opposing effects on the analyst. The analyst is likely to face a
trade-off between reporting truthfully so that she can build up her long-term reputation, and
generating more short-term trading commission by issuing biased forecasts and misleading the
investor. Put differently, the trading commission incentive may help alleviate the conformist
bias, and vice versa. Do the combined effects of the two incentives lead to the analyst fully
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revealing her private information? To investigate this issue, we assume that the analyst has
the following objective function:
maxm|P1(m)− P0|+ kE[Pr(t = g|m,ω, σ)], (4.3)
where C(m) = |P1(m) − P0| represents the trading commission motive, and E[Pr(t =
g|m,ω, σ)] represents the reputational concern. For simplicity, we assume that k > 0 is a
constant implying the weight of the analyst valuing her reputation. If k is sufficiently large,
then the conformist bias may dominate the trading commission incentive; if k is sufficiently
small, then the analyst is mainly driven by the trading commission motive.
Intuitively, if the analyst cares more about her reputation and the prior belief q is not
too extreme, she tends to truthfully report her private signal. If the prior is too extreme,
she may conform to the investor’s expectation regardless of her signal. However, when the
analyst also takes into account the trading commission, she needs to compare the gain from
maintaining a good reputation by conforming to q, with the loss in her trading commission.
Indeed, she is likely to enjoy higher trading commission by reporting truthfully in this case,
since the price change is larger following a genuine forecast, which is against the prior belief
q. Therefore, the analyst is likely to face a classic trade-off problem.
The analyst may choose between a high forecast and a low one, upon observing her
private signal σ. Assume that her total gain from a forecast is G(m|σ) = C(m)+ kE[Pr(t =
g|m,ω, σ)]. After receiving a low signal, she compares the following:
G(mh|σl) = C(mh) + kE[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σl)],
and
G(ml|σl) = C(ml) + kE[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σl)].
Upon receiving σh, the analyst compares the gain from a high forecast and that from a low
forecast. That is, she evaluates:
G(mh|σh) = C(mh) + kE[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σh)],
and
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G(ml|σh) = C(ml) + kE[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σh)].
Several empirical studies provide evidence that analysts are keen on bringing invest-
ment banking businesses to their firms and therefore are more likely to be optimistic than
pessimistic. That is, if the analyst is concerned about the fees from investment banking
businesses, she is more likely to report mh, regardless of her private information. However,
the Global Analyst Research Settlement mandates that financial analysts can no longer share
the lucrative investment banking fees. Therefore, the analyst is unlikely to be subject to the
conflict of interest from the investment banking activities. There is literally a Chinese Wall
between the investment banking arm and the research department within banks. Thus, the
trading commission incentive and the reputational concern may have greater impacts on the
analyst. In this analysis, we are interested in whether the analyst behaves in the same way
when she is only motivated by the trading commission and her reputation. More specifically,
is the analyst still more likely to be optimistic, or the two opposing motives indeed lead to
the analyst truthfully revealing her private information?
Suppose that the analyst observes σl. She then needs to evaluate G(mh|σl) and G(ml|σl)
before making a forecast. If G(mh|σl) > G(ml|σl), she prefers to discard her private signal
and report mh, perhaps to materialize the trading commission; if G(mh|σl) < G(ml|σl), she
may be more concerned by her reputation and is likely to report truthfully; if G(mh|σl) =
G(ml|σl), then the analyst is indifferent between mh and ml. However, as mentioned above,
the analyst has to convey some information so that there is demand for her forecast in the
first place. Therefore, she may prefer to report ml in this case. Specifically, the analyst
compares C(mh) − C(ml) with k(E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σl)] − E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σl)]). If the
gain in the trading commission is larger than the loss in her reputation from reporting
mh, she is likely to report mh. Otherwise, the analyst reveals her private information by
reporting ml. Similarly, if the analyst receives a high signal, she evaluates C(ml) − C(mh)
and k(E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σh)]−E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σh)]). If the former is larger than the latter,
the gain in the trading commission is sufficiently large to offset the loss in her reputation,
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and therefore she chooses to report ml. Otherwise, she reports truthfully.
For the analyst to fully reveal her private signal in both cases, the following conditions
have to be satisfied:
G(mh|σl) 6 G(ml|σl),
G(ml|σh) 6 G(mh|σh),
where the first condition implies that the analyst receives σl, and the second condition σh. The
analyst essentially compares the gain in trading commission with the loss in her reputation.
Therefore:
C(mh)− C(ml) 6 −k(E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σl)]− E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σl)]),
C(ml)− C(mh) 6 −k(E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σh)]− E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σh)]).
Intuitively, the analyst’s forecasting behavior depends on which of the above conditions
is easier to achieve. Note that the analyst’s trading commission depends not only on her
forecast m, but also on the investor’s prior belief about the firm’s earnings, which is uni-
formly distributed between 0 and 1. In fact, the more extreme the prior belief, the larger
price adjustment and therefore the more trading commission to the analyst if she reports
an opposite forecast. Conversely, the more trading commission that the analyst requires
to neutralize the loss in her reputation, the more difficult the condition to satisfy, since q
has to take a more extreme value, which is less likely to happen. For example, compare
q = 0.1 and q = 0.3. Both values indicate that the investor is pessimistic at t = 0. However,
Pr(q 6 0.1) < Pr(q 6 0.3). Or, compare q = 0.7 and q = 0.9, which imply that the investor
is optimistic. It is easy to verify that 1− Pr(q > 0.7) > 1− Pr(q > 0.9).
Specifically, if the loss in the analyst’s reputation from misreporting is lower in the first
case (when the analyst observes σl), then she demands a relatively lower gain in the trading
commission to offset the loss in her reputation. The first condition is more likely to achieve
since q does not need to be as far away from 0.5 as in the second condition (when the analyst
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observes σh).5 Therefore, the analyst is more likely to report mh when she receives σl than
report ml when she receives σh. Put differently, the analyst is more likely to be optimistic
than pessimistic in this scenario. Alternatively, if the loss in the analyst’s reputation from
misreporting is larger when she receives σl, she requires a relatively larger gain in the com-
mission to negate the loss. Therefore, she is more likely to be pessimistic than optimistic in
this case.
Proposition 3. When the analyst is concerned about both the trading commission and her
reputation, she is more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic.
Intuitively, it would be more simple for the analyst to persuade the investor to buy a
stock than sell a stock. For the latter, the investor must have already owned the stock.
In addition, investors, particularly individual investors, may not be able to short sell. Put
differently, due to the short sale restriction, the investor might not be able to achieve the
optimal stock holdings after the analyst issues a low forecast, which may lead to a downward
revision in his belief. Therefore, it may be optimal for the analyst to be optimistic rather
than pessimistic. She may be rewarded more trading commission for promoting the stock.
The finding that the analyst is more likely to be optimistic is supported by a large volume
of empirical studies. For example, Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) provide empirical
evidence that forecast optimism is closely related to brokerage activities. Jackson (2005)
studies Australian financial analysts’ forecasting strategies and concludes that the trading
commission incentive leads to optimistic forecasts, even when issuing biased reports has a
negative consequence in the analysts’ reputation. Beyer and Guttman (2011) investigate
whether the trading volume incentive biases sell-side analysts’ forecasts. They also find that
analysts are on average optimistic and their forecast error actually increases in the precision
of their private information. Finally, Hong and Kubik (2003) find firm-level evidence that
analysts are systematically rewarded for being optimistic as long as their optimism is within a
range of accuracy that maintains some credibility. Analysts who are relatively more optimistic
5q = 0.5 implies that the investor is neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
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compared to their peers are much less likely to be fired by a top brokerage house, and much
more likely to move to another house with a better reputation. These analysts are also more
likely to be assigned to cover well-known stocks, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Procter &
Gamble.
4.4 Conclusion
We provide a simple single-period model to study the effects of the trading incentive and
the reputation concern on the informativeness of analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, we analyze
the analyst’s forecasting behavior in three scenarios. If the analyst has only the reputational
concern, she is likely to conform to the investor’s extreme prior and discard her private signal,
leading to a lower degree of informativeness in her forecast; If the analyst is motivated by
only the trading commission, she has a strong incentive to report against the investor’s
prior expectation, regardless of her private information. If the analyst is motivated by both
the reputational concern and the trading incentive, she is more likely to be optimistic than
pessimistic.
However, the model we use in the above analysis is a simple one. Indeed, we only examine
two incentives (i.e., the trading commission incentive and the reputation concern) that may
bias the analyst’s forecast. Investigating other incentives (e.g., research for hire, currying
favor with the management, and institutional investor relationship) may provide interesting
findings. In addition, we assume that the analyst’s signal σ is free and she cannot improve
the precision of the signal by exerting costly efforts, which is a deviation from Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985). In practice, the analyst may need to perform a range of
tasks, such as collecting data, visiting the firm, communicating with the management, and
attending conference calls, to produce earnings forecasts. Therefore, including the analyst’s
effort in the model such that the precision of her private signal is positively correlated with
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her effort may also provide insight into the analyst forecasting behavior when facing various
incentives.
118
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The analyst fully reveals her private information only when the trad-
ing commission following a truthful forecast is no lower than that following a misleading
forecast. Suppose that she receives σl. The condition for her reporting ml instead of mh is
as follows:
C(ml) > C(mh).
Now suppose that she receives σh. The condition for her reporting mh instead of ml is:
C(mh) > C(ml).
Therefore, the condition for the analyst fully revealing her private information can be written
as:
C(mh) = C(ml),
implying:
| (ωh − ωl)(T − F )q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)
F [(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + T [ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] | =
| (ωh − ωl)(T − F )q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)(1− F )[(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q)] + (1− T )[ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q)] |.
Given the definition of truthful reporting, T = 1 and F = 0. Thus, the above equation can
be simplified to:
(ωh − ωl)q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)
ρq + (1− ρ)(1− q) =
(ωh − ωl)q(1− q)(2ρ− 1)
(1− ρ)q + ρ(1− q) ,
where the equality should hold regardless of the value of ρ, implying q = 0.5. Therefore, a
fully revealing equilibrium only exists when the investor’s prior belief is neutral.
Proof of Proposition 3. As mentioned above, the analyst’s forecasting behavior depends on
the magnitude of the loss in her reputation from misreporting. Suppose that she receives σl
and reports mh, the potential loss in her reputation, Ll is:
Ll = E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σl)]− E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σl)]
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⇒ Ll = Pr(ωh|σl)[Pr(t = g|mh, ωh)− Pr(t = g|ml, ωh)]
− Pr(ωl|σl)[Pr(t = g|ml, ωl)− Pr(t = g|mh, ωl)].
Now suppose that she receives σh and reports ml, the potential loss in the reputation, Lh is:
Lh = E[Pr(t = g|ml, ω, σh)]− E[Pr(t = g|mh, ω, σh)]
⇒ Lh = Pr(ωl|σh)[Pr(t = g|mh, ωl)− Pr(t = g|ml, ωl)]
− Pr(ωh|σh)[Pr(t = g|mh, ωh)− Pr(t = g|ml, ωh)].
Comparing Ll and Lh, we have:
Ll − Lh = [Pr(ωh|σl)− Pr(ωh|σh)][Pr(t = g|mh, ωh)− Pr(t = g|ml, ωh)]
+ [Pr(ωl|σh)− Pr(ωl|σl)][Pr(t = g|ml, ωl)− Pr(t = g|mh, ωl)].
From the assumption that the analyst’s signal is informative (ρ = Pr(σ = ω) = pρg + (1 −
p)ρb > 0.5), we have Pr(ωh|σh) > Pr(ωh|σl) and Pr(ωl|σl)>Pr(ωl|σh). Further, we already
show that if the analyst’s forecast matches the realized state, her reputation is favorably
updated, which implies Pr(t = g|mh, ωh) > Pr(t = g|ml, ωh), and Pr(t = g|ml, ωl) >
Pr(t = g|mh, ωl). Thus, Ll − Lh < 0, implying that the analyst may demand more trading
commission to compensate the loss in her reputation when she observes σh but reports ml
(being pessimistic).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we examine the the relationship between advertising and the cross-section of
stock returns. We show that a strategy that longs stocks with low growth in advertising
expense in the previous year and shorts stocks with high growth in advertising expense in
the previous year earns a significant premium. After controlling for standard risk factors,
an advertising-based tercile portfolio can earn 0.55% per month, or 6.6% per year. We also
find that the abnormal return is generated by stocks with low growth in advertising expense
in the previous year. Stocks with high growth in advertising expense in the previous year
do not exhibit significant alphas. This advertising effect is closely related to the Merton
(1987)’s investor recognition hypothesis. By sorting stocks on proxies of investor recognition
(i.e., analyst coverage and institutional ownership), we show that the advertising effect is
much weaker among stocks with a high degree of investor recognition (stocks with high
analyst coverage and stocks with a high percentage of institutional ownership). Therefore,
advertising is likely to improve investor recognition, even if it does not convey any credible
information about the firm’s future prospect.
We also explore the effect of advertising in the capital market by investigating the rela-
tionship between advertising and firm risk. We find that advertising is negatively related to
systematic risk, particularly during the 2008-2009 stock market crisis. We also find that ad-
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vertising is positively related to idiosyncratic risk in normal times, but not during the crisis.
Further, we find that firms on average had lower systematic risk but higher idiosyncratic risk
during the crisis. The negative relationship of advertising to systematic risk is likely a result
of the market-based intangible assets provided by advertising (e.g., brand equity, customer
loyalty, and bargaining power with suppliers) which may insulate the firm from market down-
turns. The results also lend support to the literature on investor limited attention. Investors,
especially institutional investors, who are attracted by advertising, may collect and trade on
private information about the firm. This action may provide investors more accurate assess-
ment of the firm’s financial performance. Thus, firms with intensive advertising may have
higher idiosyncratic in that their share prices may be more informative by incorporating this
unique information.
Finally, we turn to sell-side financial analysts, who play an important role in reducing the
degree of information asymmetries in financial markets. Analysts are supposed to provide
unbiased financial advice to investors and to assist them in making investment decisions.
However, financial analysts are exposed to various incentives and may not always provide
unbiased advice. For example, they may provide optimistic earnings forecasts in order to
acquire more trading commission. We provide a simple model to study the effects of the
trading incentive and the reputational concern on the informativeness of analyst’s earnings
forecasts. We find that if the analyst has only the reputational concern, she is likely to
discard her private signal and conform to the investor’s extreme prior, leading to a lower
degree of informativeness in her forecast; if the analyst is motivated by only the trading
commission, she has a strong incentive to report against the investor’s prior belief, regardless
of her private information; finally, if the analyst is motivated by both the reputational concern
and the trading incentive, we find that she is more likely to be optimistic than pessimistic.
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